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Abstract—Machine learning has started to be deployed in
fields such as healthcare and finance, which involves dealing with
a lot of sensitive data. This propelled the need for and growth
of privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML). We propose
an actively secure four-party protocol (4PC), and a framework
for PPML, showcasing its applications on four of the most
widely-known machine learning algorithms – Linear Regression,
Logistic Regression, Neural Networks, and Convolutional Neural
Networks.
Our 4PC protocol tolerating at most one malicious corruption
is practically efficient as compared to Gordon et al. (ASIACRYPT
2018) as the 4th party in our protocol is not active in the online
phase, except input sharing and output reconstruction stages.
Concretely, we reduce the online communication as compared to
them by 1 ring element. We use the protocol to build an efficient
mixed-world framework (Trident) to switch between the Arith-
metic, Boolean, and Garbled worlds. Our framework operates
in the offline-online paradigm over rings and is instantiated in
an outsourced setting for machine learning, where the data is
secretly shared among the servers. Also, we propose conversions
especially relevant to privacy-preserving machine learning. With
the privilege of having an extra honest party, we outperform the
current state-of-the-art ABY3 (for three parties), in terms of both
rounds as well as communication complexity.
The highlights of our framework include using a minimal
number of expensive circuits overall as compared to ABY3. This
can be seen in our technique for truncation, which does not
affect the online cost of multiplication and removes the need for
any circuits in the offline phase. Our B2A conversion has an
improvement of 7× in rounds and 18× in the communication
complexity. In addition to these, all of the special conversions
for machine learning, e.g. Secure Comparison, achieve constant
round complexity.
The practicality of our framework is argued through improve-
ments in the benchmarking of the aforementioned algorithms
when compared with ABY3. All the protocols are implemented
over a 64-bit ring in both LAN and WAN settings. Our improve-
ments go up to 187× for the training phase and 158× for the
prediction phase when observed over LAN and WAN.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning is one of the fastest-growing research
domains today. Applications for machine learning range from
smarter keyboard predictions to better object detection in self-
driving cars to avoid collisions. This is in part due to more data
being made available with the rise of internet companies such
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as Google and Amazon, as well as due to the machine learning
algorithms themselves getting more robust and accurate. In
fact, machine learning algorithms have now started to beat
humans at some complicated tasks such as classifying echocar-
diograms [1], and they are only getting better. Techniques such
as deep learning and reinforcement learning are at the forefront
making such breakthroughs possible.
The level of accuracy and robustness required is very high
to operate in mission-critical fields such as healthcare, where
the functioning of the model is vital to the working of the
system. Accuracy and robustness are governed by two factors,
one of them is the high amount of computing power demanded
to train deep learning models. The other factor influencing the
accuracy of the model is the variance in the dataset. Variance
in datasets comes from collecting data from multiple diverse
sources, which is typically infeasible for a single company to
achieve.
Towards this, companies such as Microsoft (Azure), Ama-
zon (AWS), Google (Google Cloud), etc. have entered into
space by offering “Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS)”.
MLaaS works in two different ways, depending on the end-
user. The first scenario is companies offering their trained
machine learning models that a customer can query to obtain
the prediction result. The second scenario is when multiple
customers/companies want to come together and train a com-
mon model using their datasets, but none of them wish to
share the data in the clear. While promising, both models
require the end-user to make compromises. In the case of an
individual customer, privacy of his/her query is not maintained
and in the case of companies, policies like the European Union
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) or the EFF’s call
for information fiduciary rules for businesses have made it
hard and often illegal for companies to share datasets with
each other without prior consent of the customers, security,
and other criteria met. Even with all these criteria met, data is
proprietary information of a company which they would not
want to share due to concerns such as competitive advantage.
Due to the huge interest in using machine learning, the field
of privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) has become
a fast-growing area of research that addresses the aforemen-
tioned problems through techniques for privacy-preserving
training and prediction. These techniques when deployed en-
sure that no information about the query or the datasets is
leaked beyond what is permissible by the algorithm, which
in some cases might be only the prediction output. Recently
there have been a slew of works that have used the techniques
of Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) to perform efficient
PPML, works such as [2]–[6] making huge contributions.
Secure multiparty computation is an area of extensive re-
search that allows for n mutually distrusting parties to perform
computations together on their private inputs, such that no
coalition of t parties, controlled by an adversary, can learn any
information beyond what is already known and permissible by
the algorithm. While MPC has been shown to be practical [7]–
[9], MPC for a small number of parties in the honest majority
setting [10]–[15], [15]–[19] has become popular over the
last few years due to applications such as financial data
analysis [20], email spam filtering [21], distributed credential
encryption [16], privacy-preserving statistical studies [22] that
involve only a few parties. This is also evident from popular
MPC frameworks such as Sharemind [23] and VIFF [24].
Our Setting: In this work we deal with the specific case
of MPC with 4 parties (4PC), tolerating at most 1 mali-
cious corruption. The state-of-the-art three-party (3PC) PPML
frameworks in the honest majority setting such as ABY3 [5],
SecureNN [6], and ASTRA [25] (prediction only) have fast and
efficient protocols for the semi-honest case but are significantly
slower when it comes to the malicious setting. This is primarily
due to the underlying operations such as Dot Product, Secure
Comparison, and Truncation being more expensive in the
malicious setting. For instance, the Dot Product protocol of
ABY3 incurs communication cost that is linearly dependent on
the size of the underlying vector. Since these operations are
performed many times, especially during the training phase,
more efficient protocols for these operations are crucial in
building a better PPML framework.
The motivation behind our 4PC setting is to investigate
the performance improvement, both theoretical and practical,
over the existing solutions in the 3PC setting, when given the
privilege of an additional honest party. We show later in this
work that having an extra honest party helps us achieve simpler
and much more efficient protocols as compared to 3PC. For
instance, operating in 4PC eliminates the need for expensive
multiplication triples and allows us to perform a dot product
at a cost that is independent of the size of the two vectors.
Our ML constructions are built on a new 4PC scheme,
instead of the one proposed by Gordon et al. [26], primarily
due to the following reasons:
1) Our protocol requires only three out of the four parties
to be active during most of the online phase. On the contrary,
[26] demands all the four parties to be active during the online
phase. Thus, our protocol is more efficient in the setting where
the computation is outsourced to a set of servers.
2) Using the new secret sharing scheme, our protocol shifts
25% (1 ring element) of the online communication to the
offline phase, thus improving the online efficiency.
While our setting is more communication efficient, we
assume the presence of an extra honest party which demands
an additional 3 pairwise authentic channels when compared
to that of 3PC. However, monetary cost [27] is an important
parameter to look at since the servers need to be running for
a long time for complex ML models. The time servers run
for and the compute power of the servers dictate the cost
of operation. As the fourth party in our framework does not
have to be online throughout the online phase, we can shut
the server down for most of the online phase. Aided by this
fact, the total monetary cost, which would be the total cost of
hiring 4 servers to run our framework for either the training
or prediction phase of an algorithm, we come out ahead of
ABY3, primarily because the total running time of the servers
in our framework is much lower. More details about monetary
cost are presented in Appendix E.
Offline-online paradigm: To improve efficiency, a class of
MPC protocols operates in the offline-online paradigm [28].
Data-independent computations are carried out in the offline
phase, doing so paves way for a fast and efficient online phase
of the protocol. Moreover, since the computations performed
in the offline phase are data-independent, not all the parties
need to be active throughout this phase, placing less reliance
on each party. This paradigm has proved its ability to improve
the efficiency of protocols in both theoretical [28]–[33] and
practical [4], [34]–[41] domains. It is especially useful in a
scenario like MLaaS, where the same functions need to be
performed many times and the function descriptions are known
beforehand. Furthermore, we operate in the outsourced setting
of MPC, which allows for an arbitrary number of parties to
come together and perform their joint computation via a set
of servers. Each server can be thought of as a representative
for a subset of data owners, or as an independent party. The
advantage of this setting is that it allows the framework to
easily scale for a large number of parties and the security
notions reduce to that of a standard 4PC between the servers.
Rings vs Fields: In the pursuit of practical efficiency,
protocols in MPC that operate over rings are preferred to
ones that work over finite fields. This is because of the
way computations are carried out in standard 32/64-bit CPUs.
Since these architectures have been around for a while, many
algorithms are optimized for them. Moreover, operating over
rings means that we do not have to override basic operations
such as addition and multiplication, unlike with finite fields.
Although MPC techniques have been making a lot of
progress towards being practically efficient, we cannot directly
use the current best MPC protocols to perform PPML. This is
mainly due to two reasons, which are:
1) MPC techniques operate in three different worlds – Arith-
metic, Boolean, and Garbled. Each of these worlds is naturally
better suited to carry out certain types of computations. For
example, the Arithmetic domain (over a ring Z2ℓ ) is more
suited to perform addition whereas the Garbled world is
more suited to perform division. Activation functions used
in machine learning, such as Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU),
have operations that alternate between multiplications and
comparisons. Operating in only one of the worlds, as most
of the current MPC techniques do, does not give us the
maximum possible efficiency. The mixed protocol framework
for MPC was first shown to be practical by TASTY [42], which
combined Garbled circuits and homomorphic encryption. The
idea was later applied to the ML domain by SecureML [2],
ABY3 [5] etc., where protocols to switch between the three
worlds were proposed. These mixed world frameworks have
proven to be orders of magnitude more efficient than operating
in a single world.
2) Since most of the computations and intermediate values in
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machine learning are decimal numbers, we embed them over
a ring by allocating the least significant bits to the fractional
part. But several multiplications performed may lead to an
overflow. A naive solution to avoid this is to use a large ring
to accommodate a fixed number of multiplications, but the
number of multiplications for machine learning varies based on
the algorithm, making this infeasible. SecureML tackled this
problem through truncation, which approximates the value by
sacrificing the accuracy by an infinitesimal amount, performed
after every multiplication. This technique, however, does not
extend into the 3PC or 4PC setting, due to the attack described
in ABY3, requiring us to come up with new techniques.
Frameworks such as SecureML and ABY3 have tackled both
these issues in the honest majority setting by proposing ways to
switch between the three worlds efficiently, as well as efficient
ways to do truncation. ABY3 is a lot more efficient than
SecureML, in large part due to the 3PC primitives it uses.
But ABY3 cannot avoid some expensive operations such as
evaluation of a Ripple Carry Adder (RCA) in its truncation
and activation functions. Truncation and activation functions –
ReLU and Sigmoid, need rounds proportional to the underlying
ring size in ABY3. This gives a lot of scope for improvement in
the efficiency, which we achieve through our 4PC framework.
A. Our Contribution
We propose an efficient framework for mixed world com-
putations in the four-party honest majority setting with active
security over the ring Z2ℓ . Our protocols are optimized for
PPML and follow the offline-online paradigm. Our improve-
ments come from having an additional honest party in the
protocol. Our contributions can be summed up as follows:
1) Efficient 4PC Protocol: We propose an efficient four-party
protocol with active security which proceeds through a masked
evaluation inspired by Gordon et al. [26]. Our protocol requires
3 ring elements in the online phase per multiplication as
opposed to 4 of [26], achieving a 25% improvement. This
improvement is achieved by not compromising on the total
cost (6 ring elements). Another significant advantage of our
protocol is that the fourth party is not required for evaluation
in the online phase. This is not the case with [26], where
all the parties need to be online throughout the protocol exe-
cution. In addition to the stated contributions, our framework
also achieves fairness without affecting the complexity of a
multiplication gate.
2) Fast Mixed World Computation: We propose a framework –
Trident, that is geared towards a high throughput online phase
as compared to the existing alternatives. This throughput is
achieved by making use of an additional honest party. Every
one of the conversions we propose to switch between the
worlds is more efficient in terms of online communication
complexity as compared to ABY3, with our improvements
ranging from 2× to 2κ/3×, where κ denotes the computational
security parameter. More concretely, if we aim for 128-bit
computational security, our framework gives a maximum im-
provement of ≈ 85×. For instance, the technique we propose
to perform bit composition (B2A) requires only 1 round, as
opposed to 1+log ℓ rounds in ABY3, which translates to a 7×
gain for a 64-bit ring. The table below provides the concrete
cost of our online phase in comparison to ABY3. The overall
cost comparison can be found in Table IX.
Conversion Ref. Rounds Communication
G2B
ABY3 1 κ
This 1 3
G2A
ABY3 1 2ℓκ
This 1 3ℓ
B2G
ABY3 1 2κ
This 1 κ
A2G
ABY3 1 2ℓκ
This 1 ℓκ
A2B
ABY3 1 + log ℓ 9ℓ log ℓ+ 9ℓ
This 1 + log ℓ 3ℓ log ℓ+ ℓ
B2A
ABY3 1 + log ℓ 9ℓ log ℓ+ 9ℓ
This 1 3ℓ
Table I: Online cost of share conversions of ABY3 [5] and This
work. ℓ denotes the size of underlying ring in bits and κ denotes the
computational security parameter.
3) Efficient Truncation: The highlight of the protocol we
propose for truncation is that it can be combined with our
multiplication protocol with no additional cost in the online
phase. In contrast, the online cost for multiplication in ABY3
increases from 9 to 12 ring elements, which gives us a 4×
improvement in online communication. Moreover, we forgo
the need for (2ℓ − 2)-round Ripple Carry Adders (RCA),
as opposed to ABY3, in the offline phase resulting in an
improvement of 63× in rounds for a 64-bit ring.
Conversion Ref. Rounds Communication
Multiplication
with Truncation
ABY3 1 12ℓ
This 1 3ℓ
Secure
Comparison
ABY3 log ℓ 18ℓ log ℓ
This 3 5ℓ+ 2
Bit2A
JbKB → JbK
ABY3 2 18ℓ
This 1 3ℓ
BitInj
JbKBJvK → JbvK
ABY3 3 27ℓ
This 1 3ℓ
ReLU
ABY3 3 + log ℓ 45ℓ
This 4 8ℓ+ 2
Sigmoid
ABY3 4 + log ℓ 81ℓ+ 9
This 5 16ℓ+ 7
Table II: Online cost of ML conversions of ABY3 [5] and This
work. ℓ denotes the size of underlying ring in bits.
4) Secure Comparison: We propose an efficient instantiation
of secure comparison, with constant round complexity. ABY3
in comparison uses an optimized Parallel Prefix Adder (PPA),
which takes log ℓ rounds in the online phase. This amounts
to 2× improvement in the online rounds for a 64-bit ring. We
also improve the online communication complexity by ≈ 21×.
5) ML Building Blocks: The building blocks for ML high-
lighted in the Table II (more details in Table X), have im-
provements ranging from 2× - 3× in the round complexity and
5× - 9× in the communication complexity. For the activation
functions ReLU and Sigmoid, our solution brings down the
round complexity from O(log ℓ) (of ABY3) to a constant.
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6) Implementation: We implement all the stated protocols and
test them over LAN and WAN. We benchmark the training and
prediction phases of the algorithms – Linear Regression, Lo-
gistic Regression, Neural Networks (NN), and Convolutional
Neural networks (CNN). In order to compare with ABY3, we
implement their protocols as well and obtain the benchmarks in
our environment. For the training phase of Linear Regression,
we have improvements across different configurations in the
range of 2× to 251.84×. Similarly, for Logistic Regression,
our improvements lie in the range of 2.71× to 67.88×. The
respective range of improvements for NN and CNN are 2.94×-
68.04× and 3.19×-45.64×. Table III gives the concrete gain
of the aforementioned algorithms over the most widely used
MNIST dataset [43], which has 784 features, implemented
with a batch size of 128. Moreover, our framework is able to
process 23 online iterations of NN in a second for a batch size
of 128, over LAN. This is a huge improvement over ABY3,
which can process only 2.5 iterations, that too in the semi-
honest setting. Similarly, for CNN, we could process 10.46
iterations as opposed to 2 of ABY3.
Network
Linear
Regression
Logistic
Regression
NN CNN
LAN 81.08× 27.07× 68.08× 45.64×
WAN 2.17× 2.76× 2.97× 3.19×
Table III: Gain in online throughput for ML Training over ABY3
[5] for d = 784 features and batch size of 128.
We also provide results for the prediction phase and give
throughput (no. of predictions per second) comparison details
for the aforementioned algorithms, using real-world datasets.
The gain in online throughput for prediction ranges from 3×
to 145.18× for Linear Regression and 3× to 158.40× for
Logistic Regression over LAN and WAN combined. Similarly,
the online throughput gain ranges from 335.44× to 421.72×
for NN and 598.44× to 759.65× for CNN.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
We consider a set of four parties P = {P0, P1, P2, P3}
that are connected by pair-wise private and authentic channels
in a synchronous network. The function f to be evaluated
is expressed as a circuit ckt, whose topology is publicly
known and is evaluated over either an arithmetic ring Z2ℓ
or a Boolean ring Z21 , consisting of 2-input addition and
multiplication gates. The term D denotes the multiplicative
depth of the circuit, while I,O,A,M denote the number of
input wires, output wires, addition gates and multiplication
gates respectively in ckt.
We use the notation wv to denote a wire w with value v
flowing through it. We use g = (wx,wy,wz, op) to denote a
gate in the ckt with left input wire wx, right input wire wy,
output wire wz and operation op, which is either addition (+)
or multiplication (×).
For a vector ~x, xi denotes the i
th element in the vector. For
two vectors ~x and ~y of length d, the dot product is given by,
~x ⊙ ~y =
∑d
i=1 xiyi. Given two matrices X,Y, the operation
X ◦Y denotes the matrix multiplication.
a) Shared Key Setup: In order to facilitate non-
interactive communication, parties use functionality Fsetup
that establishes pre-shared random keys for a pseudo-random
function (PRF) among them. Similar setup for the three-party
case can be found in [4], [5], [11], [12], [25].
In our protocols, we make use of a collision-resistant hash
function, denoted by H(), to save communication. We defer the
formal details of key setup and hash function to Appendix A.
III. OUR 4PC PROTOCOL
In this section, we provide details for our 4PC protocol. We
begin with the sharing semantics in Section III-A followed
by explaining the relevant building blocks in Section III-B.
We elaborate on the stages of our protocol in Section III-C.
Lastly, in Section III-D, we show how to improve the security
to achieve fairness.
A. Sharing Semantics
In this section, we explain three variants of secret sharing
that are used in this work. The sharings work over both
arithmetic (Z2ℓ) and boolean (Z21) rings.
a) [·]-sharing: A value v is said to be [·]-shared among
parties P1, P2, P3, if the parties P1, P2 and P3 respectively
hold the values v1, v2 and v3 such that v = v1 + v2 + v3. We
use [·]Pi to denote the [·]-share of party Pi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
b) 〈·〉-sharing: A value v is said to be 〈·〉-shared among
parties P1, P2, P3, if the parties P1, P2 and P3 respectively
holds values (v2, v3), (v3, v1) and (v1, v2) such that v = v1 +
v2 + v3. We denote 〈·〉-shares of the parties as follows:
〈v〉P1 = (v2, v3), 〈v〉P2 = (v3, v1), 〈v〉P3 = (v1, v2)
c) J·K-sharing: A value v is said to be J·K-shared among
parties P0, P1, P2, P3, if
– there exist values λv,mv ∈ Z2ℓ such that mv = v + λv.
– parties P1, P2, P3 know the value mv in clear, while the
value λv is 〈·〉-shared among them.
– party P0 knows λv,1, λv,2 and λv,3 in clear.
We denote the J·K-shares of the parties as follows:
JvKP0 = (λv,1, λv,2, λv,3) JvKP1 = (mv, λv,2, λv,3)
JvKP2 = (mv, λv,3, λv,1) JvKP3 = (mv, λv,1, λv,2)
We use JvK = (mv, 〈λv〉) to denote the J·K-share of v.
d) Linearity of the secret sharing schemes: Given the
[·]-sharing of x, y and public constants c1, c2, parties can locally
compute [c1x+ c2y] = c1 [x] + c2 [y].
[c1x+ c2y] = (c1x1 + c2y1, c1x2 + c2y2, c1x3 + c2y3)
= c1 [x] + c2 [y]
It is easy to see that the linearity trivially extends to
〈·〉-sharing as well. That is 〈c1x + c2y〉 = c1〈x〉 + c2〈y〉.
Similarly, given the J·K-sharing of x, y and public constants
c1, c2, parties can locally compute Jc1x + c2yK. Note that the
linearity property enables parties to non-interactively evaluate
an addition gate as well as perform the multiplication of their
shares with a public constant.
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B. Building Blocks
a) Sharing Protocol: Protocol ΠSh (Fig. 1) enables
party Pi to generate J·K-share of value v. The offline phase
is done using the pre-shared keys in such a way that Pi will
get the entire mask λ. During the online phase, Pi computes
mv and sends to P1, P2, P3 who exchange the hash values to
check for consistency.
Offline:
– If Pi = P0, parties in P \ {Pj} together sample λv,j for j ∈
{1, 2, 3}.
– If Pi = Pk for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, parties in P together sample
λv,k. In addition, parties in P \ {Pj} together sample λv,j for
j ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {k}.
Online:
– Pi computes mv = v+ λv and sends to P1, P2, P3.
– P1, P2, P3 mutually exchange H(mv) and abort if the received
values are inconsistent.
Protocol ΠSh(Pi, v)
Figure 1: J·K-sharing of a value v by party Pi.
Looking ahead, we also encounter scenarios where party P0
has to generate 〈·〉-sharing of a value v in the offline phase.
We call the resultant protocol as ΠaSh and the formal details
appear in Fig. 2.
Offline:
– Parties in P \ {P1} sample random v1 ∈ Z2ℓ , while parties in
P \ {P2} sample random v2.
– P0 computes v3 = −(v+ v1 + v2) and sends it to both P1 and
P2, who exchange H(v3) and abort if there is a mismatch.
Protocol ΠaSh(P0, v)
Figure 2: 〈·〉-sharing of a value v by party P0.
b) Reconstruction Protocol: Protocol ΠRec(P , v)
(Fig. 3) enables parties in P to compute v, given its J·K-share.
Towards this, each party receives the missing share from
one other party and hash of the missing share from one of
the other two parties. If the received shares are consistent,
he/she will proceed with the reconstruction. Reconstruction
towards a single party can be viewed as a special case of this
protocol.
Online:
– P1 receives λv,1 and H(λv,1) from P2 and P0 respectively.
– P2 receives λv,2 and H(λv,2) from P3 and P0 respectively.
– P3 receives λv,3 and H(λv,3) from P1 and P0 respectively.
– P0 receives mv and H(mv) from P1 and P2 respectively.
Pi for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} abort if the received values are inconsistent.
Else computes v = mv − λv,1 − λv,2 − λv,3.
Protocol ΠRec(P , JvK)
Figure 3: Reconstruction of value v among parties in P .
C. Stages of our 4PC protocol
Our protocol Π4PC consists of three stages, namely – Input
Sharing, Evaluation and Output Reconstruction. We elaborate
on each of these stages below.
a) Input Sharing: For each wire wv holding the value
v, of which Pi ∈ P is the owner, he/she generates J·K-share of
v by executing the ΠSh(Pi, v) protocol.
b) Evaluation: In this stage, parties evaluate the circuit
in a topological order, where the following invariant is main-
tained for every gate g: given the inputs of g in J·K-shared
fashion, the output is generated in the J·K-shared fashion. For
the case of an addition gate g = (wx,wy,wz,+), the linearity
of our sharing scheme maintains this invariant.
For a multiplication gate g = (wx,wy,wz,×), the protocol
proceeds as follows: during the offline phase, parties P1, P2, P3
locally compute [·]-shares of γxy = λxλy, followed by exchang-
ing them to form a 〈·〉-sharing of γxy. Before exchanging the
shares of γxy, the parties randomize the shares by adding a
share of 0 to the share of γxy to prevent leakage. In addition, P0
helps the parties in verifying the correctness of shares received
in the aforementioned step. During the online phase, the goal
is to compute mz. Note that,
mz = z+ λz = xy + λz = (mx − λx)(my − λy) + λz
= mxmy − λxmy − λymx + λxλy + λz
Parties P1, P2, P3 locally compute [·]-share of mz − mxmy
followed by an exchange to reconstruct mz − mxmy. By the
nature of our secret-sharing scheme, every missing share can
be computed by two parties. This facilitates the parties to
verifiably reconstruct mz − mxmy by having one party send
the missing share and the other send a hash of the same.
Each of P1, P2, P3 locally add mxmy to the result to obtain
mz. We call the resultant protocol ΠMult (Fig. 4).
Offline:
– Parties in P \ {Pj} together sample λz,j for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
– Parties invoke protocol ΠZero (Fig. 22) to generate A,B,Γ such
that A+B+Γ = 0. Parties locally compute the following:
– P0, P1 compute γxy,2 = λx,2λy,2 + λx,2λy,3 + λx,3λy,2 +A.
– P0, P2 compute γxy,3 = λx,3λy,3 + λx,3λy,1 + λx,1λy,3 +B.
– P0, P3 compute γxy,1 = λx,1λy,1 + λx,1λy,2 + λx,2λy,1 + Γ.
– Parties exchange the following:
– P1 receives γxy,3 and H(γxy,3) from P2 and P0 respectively.
– P2 receives γxy,1 and H(γxy,1) from P3 and P0 respectively.
– P3 receives γxy,2 and H(γxy,2) from P1 and P0 respectively.
– Pi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} abort if received values are inconsistent.
Online: Let m′z = mz −mxmy.
– Parties locally compute the following:
– P1, P3 compute m
′
z,2 = −λx,2my − λy,2mx + γxy,2 + λz,2.
– P2, P1 compute m
′
z,3 = −λx,3my − λy,3mx + γxy,3 + λz,3.
– P3, P2 compute m
′
z,1 = −λx,1my − λy,1mx + γxy,1 + λz,1.
– Parties exchange the following:
– P1 receives m
′
z,1 and H(m
′
z,1) from P2 and P3 respectively.
– P2 receives m
′
z,2 and H(m
′
z,2) from P3 and P1 respectively.
Protocol ΠMult(wx,wy,wz)
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– P3 receives m
′
z,3 and H(m
′
z,3) from P1 and P2 respectively.
– Pi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} abort if the received values are incon-
sistent. Else, he / she computes mz = (m
′
z,1 + m
′
z,2 + m
′
z,3) +
mxmy = m
′
z +mxmy.
Figure 4: Multiplication Protocol.
As a very important optimization, note that the exchange
of hash values for every multiplication gate can be delayed
until the output reconstruction stage. Moreover, all the corre-
sponding values can be appended and hashed, resulting in an
overall communication of only 3 ring elements.
c) Output Reconstruction: For each of the output wire
wy with value y, parties execute protocol ΠRec(P , JyK) to
reconstruct the output.
Correctness and Security: We prove the correctness of
Π4PC below and defer the security details to Appendix F.
Theorem III.1 (Correctness). Protocol Π4PC is correct.
Proof:We claim that for every wire in ckt, the parties hold
a J·K-sharing of the wire value in Π4PC. The correctness for the
input and output wires follows from ΠSh and ΠRec respectively.
The claim for addition gates follows from the linearity of J·K-
sharing. For a multiplication gate g = (wx,wy,wz,×), when
evaluated using ΠMult, the parties receive xy+λz in the online
phase, resulting in obtaining JzK. The correctness of xy+λz is
ensured through the verified reconstruction as shown in ΠMult.
Theorem III.2 (Communication Efficiency). Π4PC requires
one round with an amortized communication of 3M ring
elements during the offline phase. In the online phase, Π4PC re-
quires one round with an amortized communication of at most
3I ring elements in the Input-sharing stage, D rounds with an
amortized communication of 3M ring elements for evaluation
stage and one round with an amortized communication of 3O
elements for the output-reconstruction stage.
D. Achieving Fairness
For fairness, we need to ensure that all the parties are alive
in the protocol during the output reconstruction stage. On top
of this, we also need to prevent the adversary from mounting a
selective abort attack, where he can make some of the honest
parties abort the protocol. To achieve this, parties P1, P2, P3
set a bit b to continue, if the verification of the multiplication
gates was successful, else set it to abort, and send it to P0. P0
then sends abort back to all the parties if one of the parties
sends abort, thus ensuring aliveness. Remaining parties then
exchange their reply from P0 and follow the honest-majority
in deciding whether to proceed or abort. Since there can be
only 1 corruption, all the parties will now be on the same page,
preventing a selective abort. If the parties decide to proceed,
they exchange the missing shares. Using the fact that there is
at most 1 corruption and the structure of our secret-sharing
scheme, the most commonly received missing share will be
consistent among the honest parties.
Online:
– P1, P2, P3 set bit b = abort if the verification for multiplica-
tion fails. Else set b = continue.
– P1, P2, P3 send b to P0 who sends back abort, if he/she re-
ceives at least one abort bit. Else sends continue to P1, P2, P3.
– P1, P2, P3 mutually exchange the message received from P0.
Parties abort if the majority of the messages received are abort.
Else they exchange the missing share as follows:
– P0 receives mv from P1, P2 and H(mv) from P3 respectively.
– P1 receives λv,1 from P2, P3 and H(λv,1) from P0 respec-
tively.
– P2 receives λv,2 from P3, P1 and H(λv,2) from P0 respec-
tively.
– P3 receives λv,3 from P1, P2 and H(λv,3) from P0 respec-
tively.
– Pi for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} chooses the missing share that forms the
majority and computes v = mv − λv,1 − λv,2 − λv,3.
Protocol ΠfRec(P , JvK)
Figure 5: Fair reconstruction of value v among parties in P .
IV. MIXED PROTOCOL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present our mixed protocol framework,
Trident. Before we go into the details of it, we discuss another
world of MPC, called The Garbled World. To evaluate circuits
over a ring Z2ℓ , we operate in the arithmetic world and to
evaluate boolean circuits (Z2ℓ) we use either the boolean
world or the Garbled world, depending on the operation being
performed. Superscripts {A, B, G} are used to indicate the
respective worlds. If there is no superscript, the values are
assumed to operate in the arithmetic world.
A. The Garbled World
For the Garbled world, we use the MRZ [16] scheme
in the 4PC setting. In 4PC, parties P1, P2, P3 act as the
garblers and the party P0 acts as the sole evaluator. As an
optimisation, P0 can share his inputs with only P1, P2 instead
of all three parties. For cross-verification, P1 sends the garbled
circuit to P0 while P2 sends a hash of the it to P0. We
incorporate the recent optimisations including free XOR [?],
[44], [45], half-gates [46], [47], fixed-key AES garbling [48].
As opposed to the dishonest majority setting, this scheme
removes the need for expensive public key primitives (in terms
of communication) such as Oblivious Transfers altogether. We
present the protocols for a single bit, and each operation can
be performed ℓ times in parallel to support ℓ-bit values.
a) Sharing Semantics: For a bit v, JvKG is defined as
JvKGPi = K
0
v ∈ {0, 1}
κ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and JvKGP0 = K
v
v = K
0
v⊕
vR, where κ is the computational security parameter. Here R is
a global offset with the least significant bit as one, and is known
only to P1, P2, P3 (generated by shared randomness), and R
is common across all the J·KG-sharing. It is easy to see that
XOR of the least significant bit of JvKGP1 (resp. JvK
G
P2
, JvKGP3 )
and JvKGP0 is v. For a value v ∈ Z2ℓ , we abuse the notation
JvKG to denote the set of J·KG-shares of each bit of v.
6
Offline:
– P1, P2, P3 samples a random K
0
v ∈ {0, 1}
κ , computes K1v =
K0v ⊕ R and set JvK
G
P1
= JvKGP2 = JvK
G
P3
= K0v .
– P1, P2, P3 compute commitment of K
0
v ,K
1
v . P1, P2 send the
commitments to P0 in a random permuted order, who abort if
the received commitments mismatch.
Online:
– Pi sends K
0
v ⊕ vR to P0, who sets it as JvK
G
P0
.
– Pi decommits the right key K
v
v to P0, who abort if the
decommitment is incorrect.
Protocol ΠGSh(Pi, v)
Figure 6: J·KG-sharing of v by Pi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
b) Input Sharing: Protocol ΠGSh(Pi, v) enables Pi to
generate J·KG-sharing of value v. During the protocol, P0 needs
to ensure that it obtains the correct Kvv. To tackle this, we make
the garblers commit both keys to P0, who can then verify the
correctness by cross-checking the commitments received. The
formal details for the case when Pi is one of the garblers
appear in Fig. 6.
If Pi = P0, then Π
G
Sh(Pi, v) proceeds as follows: P0
samples random bit v1, computes v2 = v ⊕ v1 and sends v1
and v2 to P1 and P2 respectively. Parties execute Π
G
Sh(P1, v1)
and ΠGSh(P2, v2) to generate Jv1K
G and Jv2K
G respectively.
Parties then locally compute JvKG = Jv1K
G ⊕ Jv2K
G, using
the XOR gate evaluation method via the free-XOR technique.
Here, the commitments of the keys need not be permuted, as
P0 already knows the actual v1 and v2. As an optimization, the
computation of Jv1K
G can be offloaded to the offline phase.
c) Reconstruction: If Pi = P0, then P1, P2 send the
least significant bit of their shares and Pi verifies if it received
the same bit from both P1 and P2. If Pi is one of the garblers,
then P0 sends its share to Pi. Due to the authenticity of the
underlying garbling scheme [49], a corrupt P0 cannot send
an incorrect share to Pi. If there are multiple reconstructions
towards Pi ∈ {P1, P2, P3}, P0 can send the least significant
bit of its shares along with a hash of all the corresponding
shares.
d) Operations: Let u, v ∈ {0, 1} be J·KG-shared with
P1, P2, P3 holding the shares (K
0
u,K
0
v), and P0 holding the
shares (K0u ⊕ uR,K
0
v ⊕ vR). Let c denote the output.
– XOR: The parties locally compute JcKG = JuKG ⊕ JvKG .
– AND: P1, P2, P3 sample random K
0
c ∈ {0, 1}
κ, compute
K1u = K
0
u⊕R and construct a garbled table for AND using the
garbling scheme described in [46], [48]. P1 sends the garbled
table to P0, while P2 sends a hash of the table to P0. P0
evaluates the table1 to obtain JcKGP0 = K
c
c. Pi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
sets JcKGPi = K
0
c .
B. Building Blocks
a) Verifiable Arithmetic/Boolean Sharing: Protocol
ΠvSh (Fig. 7) allows two parties Pi, Pj to generate J·K-sharing
of value v in a verifiable manner. On a high level, Pi executes
1The garbled table can be send during the offline phase, while P0 needs to
evaluate the garbled circuit during the online phase.
ΠSh on v, while Pj helps in verification by sending H(mv) to
parties P1, P2, P3.
Offline: Parties execute offline steps of ΠSh(Pi, v).
Online:
– Pi computes mv = v+ λv and sends to P1, P2, P3.
– Pj computes H(mv) and sends to P1, P2, P3, who abort if the
received values are inconsistent.
Protocol ΠvSh(Pi, Pj , v)
Figure 7: Verifiable Arithmetic/Boolean sharing of a value v.
We observe that the parties can non-interactively generate
J·K-sharing of a value v when all of the parties P1, P2, P3 know
v. Parties set λv,1 = λv,2 = λv,3 = 0 andmv = v. We abuse the
notation and use ΠvSh(P1, P2, P3, v) to denote this protocol.
b) Verifiable Garbled Sharing: Protocol ΠGvSh (Fig. 8)
is adapted from ABY3 [5] and allows two parties Pi, Pj to
generate J·KG-sharing of value v in a verifiable manner. When
Pi, Pj are both garblers, one of them can send the key while
the other can send just the hash to check for inconsistency. If
P0 = Pj , the other parties (P1, P2) send commitments of the
keys in order, to P0. In addition, Pi sends the decommitment
of the actual key to P0.
Offline: P1, P2, P3 locally sample random K
0
v ∈ {0, 1}
κ, compute
K1v = K
0
v ⊕ R and set JvK
G
P1
= JvKGP2 = JvK
G
P3
= K0v .
Online:
– If (Pi, Pj) = (P1, P0):
– P1, P2 compute commitments Com(K
0
v ),Com(K
1
v ) and send
it to P0. In addition, P1 sends decommitment of Com(K
v
v) to
P0.
– P0 abort if either the received commitments are inconsistent
or the decommitment is incorrect. Else he/she sets JvKGP0 = K
v
v .
– If (Pi, Pj) = (Pk, P0) for k ∈ {2, 3}: The steps are similar
as above.
– If (Pi, Pj) = (P1, P2): P1 and P2 sends K
v
v and H(K
v
v) respec-
tively to P0, who abort if the received values are inconsistent.
Else he/she sets JvKGP0 = K
v
v .
– If (Pi, Pj) = (P1, P3) or (P2, P3): The steps are similar as
above.
Protocol ΠGvSh(Pi, Pj , v)
Figure 8: Verifiable Garbled sharing of a value v.
c) Dot Product: Given two vectors ~x and ~y, each of
size d, ΠDotP (Fig. 9) computes the dot product z = ~x ⊙
~y. ABY3 [5] and ASTRA [25] have proposed efficient dot
product protocols for the semi-honest and malicious settings.
In the semi-honest case, their dot product cost is the same as a
single multiplication, but for the malicious case it scales with
the vector size. In comparison, the cost of our dot product
is independent of the vector size. On a high level, instead of
performing reconstruction for each multiplication xj · yj for
j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, parties locally add their shares corresponding
to all the multiplications and perform a single exchange.
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Let z = ~x⊙ ~y.
Offline:
– Parties in P \ {Pj} together sample λz,j for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
– Parties invoke protocol ΠZero (Fig. 22) to generate A,B,Γ such
that A+B+Γ = 0. Parties locally compute the following:
– P0, P1 compute γxy,2 =
∑d
j=1 γxjyj ,2 =
∑d
j=1(λxj ,2λyj ,2 +
λxj ,2λyj ,3 + λxj ,3λyj ,2) + A.
– P0, P2 compute γxy,3 =
∑d
j=1 γxjyj ,3 =
∑d
j=1(λxj ,3λyj ,3 +
λxj ,3λyj ,1 + λxj ,1λyj ,3) +B.
– P0, P3 compute γxy,1 =
∑d
j=1 γxjyj ,1 =
∑d
j=1(λxj ,1λyj ,1 +
λxj ,1λyj ,2 + λxj ,2λyj ,1) + Γ.
– Parties exchange the following:
– P1 receives γxy,3 and H(γxy,3) from P2 and P0 respectively.
– P2 receives γxy,1 and H(γxy,1) from P3 and P0 respectively.
– P3 receives γxy,2 and H(γxy,2) from P1 and P0 respectively.
– Pi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} abort if the received values are inconsis-
tent.
Online: Let m′z = mz −
∑d
j=1 mxjmyj .
– Parties locally compute the following:
– P1, P3: m
′
z,2 =
∑d
j=1(−λxj ,2myj −λyj ,2mxj )+ γxy,2 +λz,2.
– P2, P1: m
′
z,3 =
∑d
j=1(−λxj ,3myj −λyj ,3mxj )+ γxy,3 +λz,3.
– P3, P2: m
′
z,1 =
∑d
j=1(−λxj ,1myj −λyj ,1mxj )+ γxy,1 +λz,1.
– Parties exchange the following:
– P1 receives m
′
z,1 and H(m
′
z,1) from P2 and P3 respectively.
– P2 receives m
′
z,2 and H(m
′
z,2) from P3 and P1 respectively.
– P3 receives m
′
z,3 and H(m
′
z,3) from P1 and P2 respectively.
– Pi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} abort if the received values are incon-
sistent. Else, he / she computes mz = (m
′
z,1 + m
′
z,2 + m
′
z,3) +
+
∑d
j=1(mxjmyj ) = m
′
z +
∑d
j=1(mxjmyj ).
Protocol ΠDotP(~x, ~y)
Figure 9: Dot Product Protocol.
C. Sharing Conversions
We now discuss the inter-sharing conversions among
Arithmetic, Boolean, and Garbled sharing.
a) Garbled to Boolean Sharing (G2B): To convert a
garbled share into the boolean world, P1, P2 first generate
the garbled and boolean shares of a random value (r) using
their shared randomness in the offline phase. In addition, they
communicate the garbled circuit which performs the XOR
of two bits along with the decoding information (Note that
the garbled circuit does not have to be communicated due to
the free XOR technique). In the online phase, P0 evaluates
and obtains v ⊕ r and sends it to P3 along with the hash of
the corresponding key. Authenticity of the underlying garbling
scheme ensures that a corrupt P0 cannot send the wrong bit, as
he will not be able to guess the right key for it.
Offline:
– P1, P2 locally sample random r ∈ Z2ℓ . Parties execute
ΠGvSh(P1, P2, r) and Π
B
vSh(P1, P2, r) to generate JrK
G and JrKB
respectively.
Protocol ΠG2B
– P1, P2, P3 garble a boolean adder circuit Add(x, y) that com-
putes x⊕y. P1 sends the garbled circuit along with the decoding
information to P0, while P2 sends a combined hash to P0.
Online:
– P0 evaluates the circuit Add on v and r to obtain v ⊕ r. P0
sends v ⊕ r along with a hash of the actual key corresponding
to v⊕ r to P3. P3 abort if the received values are inconsistent.
– Else, parties execute ΠBvSh(P3, P0, v⊕ r) to generate Jv⊕ rK
B.
– Parties locally compute JvKB = Jv⊕ rKB ⊕ JrKB.
Figure 10: Garbled to Boolean Sharing.
b) Garbled to Arithmetic Sharing (G2A): This conver-
sion proceeds in a similar way as ΠG2B. The major difference
is that instead of the garbled circuit for XOR, the parties
communicate a circuit for subtraction of two ℓ-bit values. Note
that P0 needs to communicate only a single hash combining all
the keys corresponding to the ℓ-bits of v−r.
Offline:
– P1, P2 locally sample random r ∈ Z2ℓ . Parties execute
ΠGvSh(P1, P2, r) and Π
A
vSh(P1, P2, r) to generate JrK
G and JrKA
respectively.
– P1, P2, P3 garble a subtractor circuit Sub(x, y) that computes
x − y. P1 sends the garbled circuit along with the decoding
information to P0, while P2 sends a combined hash to P0, who
abort if the received values are inconsistent.
Online:
– P0 evaluates the circuit Sub on v and r to obtain v − r. P0
sends v − r along with a combined hash of all the actual keys
corresponding to v − r to P3. P3 abort if the received values
are inconsistent.
– Else, parties execute ΠAvSh(P3, P0, v− r) to generate Jv− rK
A.
– Parties locally compute JvKA = Jv− rKA + JrKA.
Protocol ΠG2A
Figure 11: Garbled to Arithmetic Sharing.
c) Boolean to Garbled Sharing (B2G): Since the bit
v = (mv⊕λv,1)⊕(λv,2⊕λv,3) in the boolean world, if we can
get the garbled shares of x = (mv⊕λv,1) and y = (λv,2⊕λv,3),
parties can use the free XOR technique to compute the garbled
shares of v locally. Each of x, y is possessed by two parties,
enabling them to verifiably generate the garbled shares using
the protocol ΠGvSh.
Offline: P0, P1 execute Π
G
vSh(P1, P0, y) to generate JyK
G where
y = λv,2 ⊕ λv,3.
Online:
– P2, P3 execute Π
G
vSh(P2, P3, x) to generate JxK
G where x =
mv ⊕ λv,1.
– Parties locally compute JvKG = JxKG ⊕ JyKG.
Protocol ΠB2G
Figure 12: Boolean to Garbled Sharing.
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d) Arithmetic to Garbled Sharing (A2G): Similar to
ΠB2G, v = (mv − λv,1) − (λv,2 + λv,3) and the parties can
verifiably generate the garbled shares of x = (mv − λv,1) and
y = (λv,2 + λv,3) using Π
G
vSh. In the online phase, the parties
evaluate a garbled subtractor circuit to obtain the shares of
v = x− y.
Offline:
– P0, P1 execute Π
G
vSh(P1, P0, y) to generate JyK
G where y =
λv,2 + λv,3.
– P1, P2, P3 garble a subtractor circuit Sub(x, y) that computes
x − y. P1 sends the garbled circuit to P0, while P2 sends a
hash of the same to P0, who abort if the received values are
inconsistent.
Online:
– P2, P3 execute Π
G
vSh(P2, P3, x) to generate JxK
G where x =
mv − λv,1.
– Parties compute JvKG = JxKG − JyKG by evaluating circuit
Sub.
Protocol ΠA2G
Figure 13: Arithmetic to Garbled Sharing.
e) Arithmetic to Boolean Sharing (A2B): This conver-
sion proceeds similarly to ΠA2G, the only difference being
parties now generate boolean shares of x = (mv − λv,1) and
y = (λv,2 + λv,3) and evaluate a boolean subtractor circuit in-
stead to compute boolean shares of v = x−y.
Offline: P0, P1 execute Π
B
vSh(P1, P0, y) to generate JyK
B where
y = λv,2 + λv,3.
Online:
– P2, P3 execute Π
B
vSh(P2, P3, x) to generate JxK
B where x =
mv − λv,1.
– Parties compute JvKB = JxKB − JyKB by evaluating an ℓ-bit
Boolean subtractor circuit Sub.
Protocol ΠA2B
Figure 14: Arithmetic to Boolean Sharing.
f) Bit to Arithmetic Sharing (Bit2A): Let u and v
denote the bits λb and mb respectively over the ring Z2ℓ . Then,
b = mb ⊕ λb = v+ u− 2vu
Party P0 generates 〈·〉-shares of u in the offline phase. To
ensure the correctness of the shares, parties P1, P2, P3 check
whether the following equation holds – (λb ⊕ rb)
′ = u+ r′b −
2ur′b where the superscript (
′) denotes the corresponding bits
over ring Z2ℓ . After the verification, parties locally convert
〈u〉 to JuK. In the online phase, parties multiply JuK, JvK to
generate JuvK followed by locally computing JbK = JvK +
JuK − 2JuvK. Note that since λv is set to 0 while executing
ΠSh(P1, P2, P3, v) protocol, γuv-sharing is not needed during
multiplication.
Offline: Let u and λu,i denote the bits λb and λb,i respectively
over the ring Z2ℓ . Here i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
– P0 executes ΠaSh(P0, u) (Fig. 2) to generate 〈u〉. Let the shares
be 〈u〉P1 = (u2, u3), 〈u〉P2 = (u3, u1), and 〈u〉P3 = (u1, u2).
– P1, P2, P3 performs the following check:
– P1, P2 sample a random ring element r and a random bit rb.
Let r′b denotes the bit rb over ring Z2ℓ .
– P1 computes x1 = λb,3⊕ rb, y1 = (u2+ u3)(1− 2r
′
b)+ r
′
b+ r
and sends (x1, y1) to P3.
– P2 computes y2 = u1(1− 2r
′
b)− r and sends H(y2) to P3.
– P3 computes x = λb ⊕ rb = x1 ⊕ λb,1 ⊕ λb,2 and abort if
H(x′ − y1) 6= H(y2). Here x
′ denotes the bit x over ring Z2ℓ .
– If the verification succeeds, P1, P2, P3 converts 〈u〉 to JuK
locally by setting mu = 0 and 〈λu〉 = −〈u〉.
Online: Let v denotes the bit mb over ring Z2ℓ .
– Parties execute ΠvSh(P1, P2, P3, v) to generate JvK.
– Parties execute ΠMult on JuK and JvK to generate JuvK.
– Parties locally compute JbK = JvK + JuK− 2JuvK.
Protocol ΠBit2A
Figure 15: Bit to Arithmetic Sharing.
g) Boolean to Arithmetic Sharing (B2A): We use the
fact that a value v can be expressed as
∑ℓ−1
i=0 2
i · vi, where vi
denotes the ith bit of v over a ring Z2ℓ . Note that
v =
ℓ−1∑
i=0
2i · vi =
ℓ−1∑
i=0
2i · (m′vi + λ
′
ui
− 2m′vi · λ
′
ui
)
where m′vi and λ
′
ui
denote the bits mvi and λui respectively
over the ring Z2ℓ .
The offline phase of ΠB2A proceeds similar to ΠBit2A, where
each bit λvi for i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ − 1} is converted to 〈·〉-share.
During the online phase, parties locally compute [·]-shares
of v followed by generating J·K-shares of it by executing
ΠvSh protocol. Parties then locally add their shares to obtain
JvK.
Offline: Let vi denotes the ith bit of value v. Let pi and λpi,j
denote the bits λvi and λvi,j respectively over the ring Z2ℓ , where
i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ− 1} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
– Parties execute offline steps of ΠBit2A on each pi for i ∈
{0, . . . , ℓ − 1}, to generate 〈pi〉. Let the shares be 〈pi〉P1 =
(pi,2, pi,3), 〈pi〉P2 = (pi,3, pi,1), and 〈pi〉P3 = (pi,1, pi,2).
Online: Let qi for i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ−1} denotes bitmvi over Z2ℓ .
– Parties compute the following:
– P1, P3 compute x =
∑ℓ−1
i=0 2
i(qi + pi,2 − 2qi · pi,2).
– P2, P1 compute y =
∑ℓ−1
i=0 2
i(pi,3 − 2qi · pi,3).
– P3, P2 compute z =
∑ℓ−1
i=0 2
i(pi,1 − 2qi · pi,1).
– Parties generate JxK, JyK and JzK by executing ΠvSh(P1, P3, x),
ΠvSh(P2, P1, y) and ΠvSh(P3, P2, z) respectively.
– Parties locally compute JvK = JxK + JyK + JzK.
Protocol ΠB2A
Figure 16: Boolean to Arithmetic Sharing V2.
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h) Bit Injection (BitInj): JbKBJvK → JbvK: Let y1 and
y2 denote the values λb and λbλv respectively over ring Z2ℓ .
Similarly, let x0, x1, x2 and x3 denote the values (mbmv), (mb),
(mv−2mvmb) and (2mb−1) respectively over ring Z2ℓ . Then,
b · v = (mb ⊕ λb)(mv − λv) = x0 − x1y1 + x2y2 + x3y3
Offline: Let y1 and y2 denote the values λb and λbλv respectively
over Z2ℓ .
– P0 executes ΠaSh(P0, yj) to generate 〈yj〉 for j ∈ {1, 2}. Let
the shares be 〈yj〉P1 = (yj,2, yj,3), 〈yj〉P2 = (yj,3, yj,1), and
〈yj〉P3 = (yj,1, yj,2).
– Parties verify the correctness of 〈y1〉 using the steps similar
to protocol ΠBit2A (Fig. 15). To verify the correctness of 〈y2〉,
parties proceed as follows:
– Parties execute ΠZero (Fig. 22) to generate A,B,Γ such that
A+B + Γ = 0.
– P1 computes u2 = λy1,2λv,2 + λy1,2λv,3 + λy1,3λv,2 + A.
– P2 computes u3 = λy1,3λv,3 + λy1,3λv,1 + λy1,1λv,3 +B.
– P3 computes u1 = λy1,1λv,1 + λy1,1λv,2 + λy1,2λv,1 + Γ.
– P1 and P2 send z2 and H(−z3) respectively to P3, where
z2 = u2 − y2,2 and z3 = u3 − y2,3.
– P3 sets z1 = u1 − y2,1 and abort if H(z1 + z2) 6= H(−z3).
Online: Let x0, x1, x2 and x3 denote the values (mbmv), (mb),
(mv − 2mvmb) and (2mb − 1) respectively over ring Z2ℓ .
– Parties compute the following:
– P1, P3 compute c2 = x0 − x1λv,2 + x2y1,2 + x3y2,2.
– P2, P1 compute c3 = −x1λv,3 + x2y1,3 + x3y2,3.
– P3, P2 compute c1 = −x1λv,1 + x2y1,1 + x3y2,1.
– Parties execute ΠvSh(P1, P3, c2), ΠvSh(P2, P1, c3) and
ΠvSh(P3, P2, c1) to generate Jc2K, Jc3K and Jc1K respectively.
– Parties locally compute JbvK = Jc1K + Jc2K + Jc3K.
Protocol ΠBitInj
Figure 17: Bit Injection: JbKBJvKA → JbvKA.
In the offline phase, P0 generates 〈·〉-shares of λ
′
b and λbλv
where λ′b denotes the bit λb over Z2ℓ . The check for 〈λ
′
b〉 is the
same as the one for ΠBit2A, to check 〈λbλv〉 parties proceed as
mentioned in protocol ΠBitInj above. During the online phase,
parties locally compute [·]-shares of b·v followed by generating
J·K-shares of it by executing ΠvSh protocol. Parties then locally
add their shares to obtain Jb · vK.
V. PRIVACY PRESERVING MACHINE LEARNING
Most of the intermediate values in machine learning algo-
rithms involve operating over decimals. To represent decimal
values, we use signed two’s compliment over Z2ℓ [2], [5], [25],
where the most significant bit (msb) represents the sign and
the last d bits represent the fractional part.
In order to perform privacy-preserving machine learning,
we need efficient instantiations of three components – Share
Truncation, Secure Comparison, and Non-linear Activation
Functions. This section covers our protocols for performing
the aforementioned components.
A. Share Truncation
We take inspiration for truncation from ABY3 [5], where
they perform it on shares after evaluating a multiplication gate,
preserving the underlying value with very high probability. Our
approach improves upon ABY3 by not using any boolean cir-
cuits, thus improving the offline round complexity to constant.
Offline:
– Parties execute the offline steps of protocol ΠMult(wx,wy,wz)
apart from λz not being generated.
– Parties locally sample the following random values:
P \ {P2} : r2, P \ {P1} : r1, P \ {P3} : r3
– P0 locally compute r = r1+r2+r3, locally truncates it to obtain
rt and executes ΠaSh(P0, r
t) to generate 〈rt〉. Let the shares be
〈rt〉P1 = (r
t
2, r
t
3), 〈r
t〉P2 = (r
t
3, r
t
1), and 〈r
t〉P3 = (r
t
1, r
t
2).
– Let rd and rd,i denote the last d bits of r and ri respectively
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Parties verify the correctness of 〈rt〉 as
follows:
– P1 samples a random element c and computes m1 = r2 −
2drt2 − rd,2 + c. P1 sends (m1,H(c)) to P2.
– P2 computes m2 = (r1 + r3)− 2
d(rt1 + r
t
3)− (rd,1 + rd,3) and
abort if H(m1 +m2) 6= H(c).
– Parties locally convert 〈rt〉 to JrtK by setting mrt = 0 and
〈λrt〉 = 〈r
t〉.
Online: Let z′ = (z− r) −mxmy.
– Parties locally compute the following:
– P1, P3 compute [z
′]2 = −λx,2my − λy,2mx + γxy,2 − r2.
– P2, P1 compute [z
′]3 = −λx,3my − λy,3mx + γxy,3 − r3.
– P3, P2 compute [z
′]1 = −λx,1my − λy,1mx + γxy,1 − r1.
– Parties exchange the following:
– P1 receives [z
′]1 and H([z
′]1) from P2 and P3 respectively.
– P2 receives [z
′]2 and H([z
′]2) from P3 and P1 respectively.
– P3 receives [z
′]3 and H([z
′]3) from P1 and P2 respectively.
– Pi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} abort if the received values are inconsis-
tent. Else, he computes (z− r) = [z′]1 + [z
′]2 + [z
′]3 +mxmy.
– P1, P2, P3 locally truncates (z− r) to obtain (z− r)
t, followed
by executing ΠvSh(P1, P2, P3, (z− r)
t) to generate J(z− r)tK.
– Parties locally compute JztK = J(z− r)tK + JrtK.
Protocol ΠMultTr(wx,wy,wz)
Figure 18: Multiplication with Truncation.
We start by generating a random (r, rt) in the offline phase,
where rt is the truncated value of r. The truncated value of z
can be obtained by first opening and truncating z−r, and then
adding it to rt. Parties non-interactively generate 〈r〉, such that
P0 obtains r. This is followed by P0 generating Jr
tK, but since
we cannot rely on P0, parties P1, P2, P3 perform a check to
ensure the correctness of the share. On a high level, parties
check the relation r = 2drt + rd, where rd denotes the last d
bits of r The formal details of the check are provided in the
protocol above and the correctness appears in Lemma D.1.
B. Secure Comparison
The secure comparison technique allows parties to check
whether x < y, given arithmetic shares of x, y. In fixed point
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arithmetic, a simple way to achieve this is by computing x−y,
and checking its sign, stored in the msb position. This protocol,
inspired from ASTRA [25], is called Bit Extraction (ΠBitExt),
since it extracts a bit from the given arithmetic shares and
outputs the boolean shares of the bit.
Offline:
– P1, P2 sample random r ∈ Z2ℓ and set x = msb(r).
– Parties execute ΠvSh(P1, P2, r) and Π
B
vSh(P1, P2, x) to generate
JrK and JxKB respectively.
Online:
– Parties execute ΠMult on JrK and JvK to generate JrvK, followed
by reconstructing rv towards P0 and P3.
– P3, P0 set y = msb(rv) followed by executing Π
B
vSh(P3, P0, y)
to generate JyKB.
– Parties locally compute Jmsb(v)KB = JxKB ⊕ JyKB.
Protocol ΠBitExt(P , JvK)
Figure 19: Extraction of MSB bit of value v.
C. Activation Functions
a) ReLU: The ReLU function is defined as relu(v) =
max(0, v). This can be viewed as relu(v) = (1⊕b)v where bit
b = 1 if v < 0 and 0 otherwise. In order to generate Jrelu(v)K,
parties first execute ΠBitExt on v to obtain JbK
B and locally
compute J1 ⊕ bKB. This is followed by executing ΠBitInj on
J1⊕bKB and JvK. The derivative of relu, denoted by drelu(v) =
(1⊕ b).
b) Sigmoid: In our protocols, we use the approximation
of sigmoid function [2], [5], [25], defined as:
sig(v) =


0 v < − 12
v + 12 −
1
2 ≤ v ≤
1
2
1 v > 12
This can be viewed as, sig(v) = (1⊕b1)b2(v+1/2)+(1⊕b2),
where b1 = 1 if v+ 1/2 < 0 and b2 = 1 if v− 1/2 < 0. The
protocol is similar to that of relu apart from an additional bit
extraction, bit multiplication and a bit injection is required.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND BENCHMARKING
The improvements of our framework over the current state-
of-the-art (ABY3) are showcased through our implementa-
tion, comparing the two. The training and prediction phases
of Linear Regression, Logistic Regression, Neural Networks
(NN), and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) are used for
benchmarking. While we compare our construction with the
malicious ABY3 in this section, the comparison of ours with
the semi-honest version of ABY3 and with the 4PC protocol
of Gordon et al. [26] are deferred to Appendix E.
a) Environment Details: We provide results for both
LAN (1Gbps bandwidth) and WAN (40Mbps bandwidth) set-
tings. In the LAN setting, we have machines with 3.6 GHz
Intel Core i7-7700 CPU and 32 GB RAM. In the WAN
setting, we use Google Cloud Platform2 with machines located
2https://cloud.google.com/
in West Europe (P0), East Australia (P1), South Asia (P2)
and South East Asia (P3). We use n1-standard-8 instances,
where machines are equipped with 2.3 GHz Intel Xeon E5
v3 (Haswell) processors supporting hyper-threading, with 8
vCPUs, and 30 GB RAM. We measured the average round-
trip time (rtt) for communicating 1 KB of data between every
pair of parties. Over the LAN setting, the rtt turned out to be
0.296ms. In the WAN setting, the rtt values were
P0-P1 P0-P2 P0-P3 P1-P2 P1-P3 P2-P3
274.83ms 174.13ms 219.45ms 152.3ms 60.19ms 92.63ms
We implement our protocols using the ENCRYPTO li-
brary [50] in C++17 over a 64 bit ring. Since the codes for
ABY3 and MRZ [16] are not publicly available, we implement
their protocols in our environment. The hash function is
instantiated using SHA-256. We use multi-threading, wherever
possible, to facilitate efficient computation and communication
among the parties. To even out the results, each experiment is
run 20 times and the average values are reported.
b) Datasets: To benchmark the training phase of ma-
chine learning algorithms, it is common practice to use
synthetic datasets so that we have freedom to choose the
parameters of the datasets. However, testing the accuracy of a
trained model must be carried out with a real dataset, which is
the MNIST [43] in our case. It contains 28×28 pixel images of
handwritten numbers and 784 features. For benchmarking of
the prediction phase, we use the following real-world datasets:
Dataset #features #samples
Candy (CD) Power Ranking [51] 13 85
Boston (BT) Housing Prices [52] 14 506
Weather (WR) Conditions in World War Two [53] 31 ≈119000
CalCOFI (CI) - Oceanographic Data [54] 74 ≈876000
Epileptic (EP) Seizures [55] 179 ≈11500
Food Recipes (RE) [56] 680 ≈20000
MNIST [43] 784 70000
We choose Boston, Weather and CalCOFI for linear regression,
since they are best suited for it, while Candy, Epileptic and
Recipes were chosen for logistic regression. For NN and CNN,
we used the MNIST dataset.
A. Secure Training
The training phase in most of the machine learning algo-
rithms consists of two stages– i) forward propagation, where
the model computes the output, and ii) backward propagation,
where the model parameters are adjusted according to the
computed output and the actual output. We define one iteration
in the training phase as one forward propagation followed by
a backward propagation.
This section covers the improvements in the training phase
of our protocol as compared to ABY3. We report the per-
formance in terms of the number of iterations over varying
feature (d) and batch sizes (B), where d ∈ {10, 100, 1000} and
B ∈ {128, 256, 512}. In LAN, we use iterations per second
(#it/sec) as the metric, but since rtt is much higher for WAN,
we instead use iterations per minute (#it/min).
a) Linear Regression: For linear regression, one itera-
tion can be viewed as updating the weight vector ~w using the
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Gradient Descent algorithm (GD). The update function for ~w
is given by
~w = ~w −
α
B
XTi ◦ (Xi ◦ ~w −Yi)
where α denotes the learning rate and Xi denotes a subset
of batch size B, randomly selected from the entire dataset
in the ith iteration. Here the forward propagation consists of
computing Xi ◦ ~w, while the weight vector is updated in the
backward propagation. The update function consists of a series
of matrix multiplications, which in turn can be achieved using
dot product protocols. The operations of subtraction as well as
multiplication by a public constant can be performed locally.
We observe that the aforementioned update function can be
computed entirely in the arithmetic domain and can be viewed
in form of J·K-shares as
J~wK = J~wK−
α
B
JXTj K ◦ (JXjK ◦ J~wK− JYjK)
Network #features Ref.
Batch Size B
128 256 512
LAN
#it/sec
10
ABY3 287.36 246.92 186.22
This 1639.35 1204.82 1162.8
100
ABY3 110.38 62.08 29.27
This 1587.31 1176.48 1136.37
1000
ABY3 13.51 6.88 3.43
This 1095.3 883.4 861.33
WAN
#it/min
10
ABY3 97.57 97.57 97.57
This 195.14 195.14 195.14
100
ABY3 97.57 97.11 95.08
This 195.14 195.14 195.14
1000
ABY3 89.95 80.10 68.94
This 195.14 195.14 195.14
Table IV: Comparison of ABY3 (Malicious) and This for Linear
Regression (higher = better).
Table IV provides concrete values for Linear Regression.
Our improvement over LAN ranges from 4.88× to 251.84×
and 2× to 2.83× over WAN. The gain comes due to two
factors: One being the amount we save through our feature-
independent communication of the dot product protocol (3 ring
elements as opposed to 9d). The other factor is our efficient
truncation protocol, which reduces the online communication
from 12 elements to 3 elements – by 75%. The reason for the
discrepancy in gains in LAN and WAN is because in LAN,
the rtt is in the order of microseconds, and scales with the
communication size. In contrast, the rtt in WAN is in the order
of milliseconds and does not scale with communication up to
a threshold, within which all our protocols operate.
b) Logistic Regression: The iteration for the case of
logistic regression is similar to that of linear regression, apart
from an activation function being applied on Xi ◦ ~w in the
forward propagation. We instantiate the activation function
using sigmoid (Section V-C). The update function for ~w is
given by
~w = ~w −
α
B
XTi ◦ (sig(Xi ◦ ~w)−Yi)
One iteration of logistic regression incurs an additional cost
for computing sig(Xj ◦ ~w) as compared with that for linear
regression.
Network #features Ref.
Batch Size B
128 256 512
LAN
#it/sec
10
ABY3 56.95 42.02 30.35
This 338.99 257.01 226.61
100
ABY3 43.34 27.89 16.2
This 336.71 255.69 225.64
1000
ABY3 11.36 6.06 3.13
This 307.41 238.44 212.23
WAN
#it/min
10
ABY3 20.54 20.54 20.52
This 55.76 55.76 55.76
100
ABY3 20.54 20.52 20.41
This 55.76 55.76 55.76
1000
ABY3 20.18 19.64 18.87
This 55.76 55.76 55.76
Table V: Comparison of ABY3 (Malicious) and This for Logistic
Regression (higher = better).
Table V provides concrete values for Logistic Regression.
Logistic Regression can be thought of as an execution of
Linear Regression followed by a Sigmoid function on the
output, due to which our improvements for Linear Regression
carry over to Logistic. Our improvement ranges from 5.95×
to 67.88× over LAN and 2.71× to 2.96× over WAN. Our
efficient Sigmoid protocol takes this result further by improv-
ing upon the round and communication complexity. The round
complexity is brought down to constant from 4 + log ℓ to 5.
Instantiated over ring Z264 , this amounts to an improvement of
50%. The communication is also improved by ≈ 80% (from
81 elements to roughly 16).
c) Neural Networks: For the case of NN, we follow
steps similar to that of ABY3, where each node across all the
layers, except the last layer, uses ReLU (relu) as the activation
function. At the output layer, we use the MPC friendly vari-
ant of the softmax activation function, smx(ui) =
relu(ui)∑nf
j=1 relu(uj)
,
proposed by SecureML [2]. In order to perform the division,
we switch from arithmetic to garbled world and then use a
division garbled circuit.
The network is trained using the Gradient Descent, where
the forward propagation comprises of computing activation
matrices for all the layers in the network. Here, the activation
matrix for all the layers except the output, is defined as
Ai = relu(Ui), where Ui = Ai−1 ◦Wi . A0 is initialized to
Xj , where Xj is a subset of batch size B, randomly selected
from the entire dataset for the jth iteration. The activation
matrix for the output layer is defined as Am = smx(Um).
During the backward propagation, error matrices are com-
puted first. The error matrix for the output layer is defined
as Em = (Am − T), while for the remaining layers it is
defined as Ei = (Ei+1 ◦W
T
i )⊗drelu(Ui). Here the operation
⊗ denotes element wise multiplication and drelu denotes the
derivative of ReLU. This is followed by updating the weights
as Wi = Wi −
α
B
ATi−1 ◦Ei.
We consider a NN with two hidden layers, each having 128
nodes followed by an output layer of 10 nodes. After each
layer, the activation function ReLU is applied. NN training
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Network Ref.
LAN (#it/sec) WAN (#it/min)
B-128 B-256 B-512 B-128 B-256 B-512
NN
ABY3 0.37 0.25 0.15 4.69 4.28 3.87
This 23.00 13.55 7.70 13.94 13.94 13.79
CNN
ABY3 0.23 0.18 0.13 4.34 4.05 3.71
This 10.46 5.63 2.99 13.86 13.67 13.16
Table VI: Comparison of ABY3 (Malicious) and This for NN and
CNN (higher = better).
involves one forward pass followed by one back-propagation.
In LAN, the number of iterations is maximum with a batch of
128, at 22.99 #it/sec, and comes down to 7.70 with a batch
size of 512. Similarly, over WAN it is maximum at 13.94
and comes down to 13.79. As expected, the #it/sec has not
decreased with increase in features due to our dot product
protocol being feature-independent in terms of communication.
ABY3 on the other hand, has reported 2.5 #it/sec with a batch
size of 128, in the computationally lighter semi-honest setting.
Table VI above provides more details.
We also considered a CNN discussed in [4] with 2 hidden
layers, consisting of 100 and 10 nodes. Similar to ABY3, we
overestimate the running time by replacing the convolutional
kernel with a fully connected layer. In LAN, the number of
iterations is maximum with a batch of 128, at 10.46 #it/sec,
and comes down to 2.99 with a batch size of 512. Similarly,
over WAN it is maximum at 13.86 and comes down to 13.16.
B. Secure Prediction
For Secure Prediction, we use online latency of the protocol
as a metric to compare both works. The units are milliseconds
in LAN and seconds in WAN. We use the MNIST dataset,
which has 784 features, with a batch size of 1 and 100 for
benchmarking. Our truncation protocol causes a bit-error at
the least significant bit position, which is the same as that of
ABY3 and SecureML [2] due to similarity in the techniques.
We refer the readers to SecureML for a detailed analysis of the
bit-error. The accuracy of the prediction itself however, ranges
from 93% for linear regression to 98.3% for CNN.
Network
Batch
Size
Ref.
Linear
Regression
Logistic
Regression
NN CNN
LAN
(ms)
1
ABY3 2.08 6.25 73.09 371.1
This 0.25 1.75 4.51 5.4
100
ABY3 37.80 49.68 1284.95 2010.06
This 0.30 2.55 17.17 39.63
WAN
(s)
1
ABY3 0.47 2.77 6.02 6.25
This 0.16 0.93 2.31 2.31
100
ABY3 0.49 2.79 7.04 7.5
This 0.16 0.93 2.31 2.32
Table VII: Online Runtime of ABY3 (Malicious) and This for
Secure Prediction of Linear, Logistic, NN, and CNN models for
d = 784. (lower = better).
For Linear Regression, our improvement ranges from 3×
to 126×, considering LAN and WAN together. For Logistic
Regression, our improvement ranges from 3× to 19.48×,
considering LAN and WAN together. In NN, we achieve an
improvement ranging from 3.05× to 74.85×. Similarly for
CNN, the improvement ranges from 2.71× to 68.82×.
Though not stated explicitly, our offline cost for linear
regression is orders of magnitude more efficient as compared
to ABY3. This improvement carries over for logistic regres-
sion, NN, and CNN networks as well. A large part of this
improvement comes from the difference in the approaches to
truncation. ABY3’s approach entails using Ripple Carry Adder
(RCA) circuits, which consume 128 rounds. ABY3 has pointed
out that this was the reason SecureML performed better in total
time for a single prediction. Our approach on the other hand,
does not use any such circuit, resulting in an improvement of
≈ 15× in communication and 64× in rounds.
Throughput Comparison: We use a different metric to
better illustrate the impact of our efficiency in the case of
secure prediction, which is online throughput. Online through-
put over LAN is the number of predictions that can be made
in a second, and over WAN it is the number of predictions
per minute. We have a total of 32 threads over 4 CPU cores,
wherein each thread can perform 100 queries simultaneously
without reduction in performance. Table VIII provides the
online throughput comparison of ABY3 and ours for secure
prediction over real-world datasets in a LAN setting. The
gains for linear regression range from 26.16× to 145.18× and
from 5.69× to 158.40× for logistic regression. Similarly, we
observed gains of 335.44× and 598.44× for NN and CNN
respectively.
Ref.
Linear Regression Logistic Regression NN CNN
BT WR CI CD EP RE MNIST
ABY3 4.08 1.74 0.73 2.20 0.29 0.08 0.46 0.06
This 106.67 106.67 106.67 12.55 12.55 12.55 153.39 37.43
Table VIII: Online Throughput Comparison of ABY3 (Malicious)
and This for Secure Prediction over LAN. (higher = better)
In WAN, even though our protocols are more communi-
cation efficient as compared to ABY3, we could not fully
capitalize on it especially for Linear Regression and Logistic
Regression. This is due to the limitation of being able to
run only 32 CPU threads in parallel, which amounts to a
lot of bandwidth not being utilized. This gap can be closed
by introducing more CPU threads into our infrastructure.
However, since we could not do this, in order to showcase
the efficiency better, we limit the bandwidth and compute the
gain in online throughput. As evident from the plot in Fig. 20,
the gain increases as we limit the bandwidth. We observe that
our protocols for Linear Regression and Logistic Regression
achieve maximum bandwidth utilization at around 1.5 Mbps.
On the other hand, NN and CNN utilize the entire bandwidth,
even at 40 Mbps. So decreasing the bandwidth does have an
effect on the throughput for NN and CNN.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented an efficient privacy-preserving
machine learning framework for the four-party setting, tolerat-
ing at most one malicious corruption. The theoretical improve-
ments over the state-of-the-art 3PC framework of ABY3 were
backed up by an extensive benchmarking. The improvements
show that the availability of an additional honest party can
improve the performance of ML protocols while at the same
time, decreasing the total monetary cost of hiring the servers.
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Figure 20: Throughput Gain in Low-end Networks.
An interesting open problem is extending this framework to
the n party setting. Improving the security to guaranteed output
delivery with a minimal trade-off in the concrete performance
is another challenging problem. Another direction would be
to try to integrate the protocols proposed in this paper into a
compiler such as HyCC [57], which already has support for
the two-party framework of ABY.
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APPENDIX A
BUILDING BLOCKS
a) Collision Resistant Hash: Consider a hash function
family H = K × L → Y . The hash function H is said to be
collision resistant if for all probabilistic polynomial-time ad-
versaries A, given the description of Hk where k ∈R K, there
exists a negligible function negl() such that Pr[(x1, x2) ←
A(k) : (x1 6= x2) ∧ Hk(x1) = Hk(x2)] ≤ negl(κ), where
m = poly(κ) and x1, x2 ∈R {0, 1}
m.
b) Shared Key Setup: Let F : 0, 1κ × 0, 1κ → X be
a secure PRF, with co-domain X being Z2ℓ . The set of keys
are:
– One key shared between every pair of parties - kij for
(Pi, Pj) where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
– One key shared between every group of three parties - kijk
for (Pi, Pj , Pk) where i, j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
– One key shared amongst all - kP .
We present the ideal world functionality Fsetup below.
Fsetup interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S . Fsetup
picks random keys kij and kijk for i, j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and kP .
Let yi denote the keys corresponding to party Pi. Then
– yi = (k01, k02, k03, k012, k013, k023 and kP) when Pi = P0.
Functionality Fsetup
– yi = (k01, k12, k13, k012, k013, k123 and kP) when Pi = P1.
– yi = (k02, k12, k23, k012, k023, k123 and kP) when Pi = P2.
– yi = (k03, k13, k23, k013, k023, k123 and kP) when Pi = P3.
Output to adversary: If S sends abort, then send (Output,⊥)
to all the parties. Otherwise, send (Output, yi) to the adversary S ,
where yi denotes the keys corresponding to the corrupt party.
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I}) from
adversary S , where {I} denotes a subset of the honest parties.
If an honest party Pi belongs to I , send (Output,⊥), else send
(Output, yi).
Figure 21: Functionality for Shared Key Setup
c) Generating Zero Share, ΠZero: Protocol ΠZero
(Fig. 22) enables parties in P to generate a 〈·〉-sharing of
zero among P1, P2, P3. In detail, parties P1, P2 and P3 obtain
values A,B and Γ respectively such that A+ B + Γ = 0. In
addition, P0 obtains all the values A,B and Γ. The protocol is
adapted to the 4PC setting from the 3PC protocol of [10], and
we use FZero to denote the ideal-world functionality for the
same. We omit the proof for ΠZero and refer readers to [10]
since the protocols are almost similar.
– Parties use the Fsetup functionality to establish the following set
of keys among them:
P \ {P3} : k2, P \ {P1} : k3, P \ {P2} : k1
– Using the above set of keys and the PRF F , parties compute
the following:
– P0, P1 : A = F (k2)− F (k1).
– P0, P2 : B = F (k3)− F (k2).
– P0, P3 : Γ = F (k1)− F (k3).
Protocol ΠZero
Figure 22: Generating [·]-sharing of zero
APPENDIX B
ANALYSIS OF OUR 4PC PROTOCOL
Lemma B.1 (Communication). Protocol ΠSh (Fig. 1) is non-
interactive in the offline phase and requires 1 round and an
amortized communication of 3ℓ bits in the online phase.
Proof: During the offline phase, parties sample the λ-
shares non-interactively using the shared key setup. During
the online phase, Pi sends m-value to P1, P2, P3 resulting in
1 round and a communication of at most 3ℓ bits (for the case
when Pi = P0). Parties P1, P2, P3 then mutually exchange
the hash of m-value received from P0. Parties can combine
m-values for several instances into a single hash and hence
the cost gets amortized over multiple instances.
Lemma B.2 (Communication). ProtocolΠaSh (Fig. 2) requires
1 round and an amortized communication of 2ℓ bits in the
offline phase.
Proof: Protocol ΠaSh is performed entirely in the offline
phase. During the protocol, P0 computes and sends v3 to
both P1 and P2 resulting in 1 round and a communication
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of 2ℓ bits. Parties P1, P2 mutually exchange hash of the value
received from P0 to ensure consistency. Similar to ΠSh, hash
for multiple instances can be combined and hence this cost
gets amortized over multiple instances.
Lemma B.3 (Communication). ProtocolΠRec (Fig. 3) requires
1 round and an amortized communication of 4ℓ bits in the
online phase.
Proof: During the protocol, each party receives his/her
missing share from another party, resulting in 1 round and a
communication of 4ℓ bits. In addition, each party receives a
hash of the missing share from another party for verification.
The hash for multiple instances can be combined to a single
hash and thus this cost gets amortized over multiple instances.
Lemma B.4 (Communication). Protocol ΠMult (Fig. 4) re-
quires 1 round and an amortized communication of 3ℓ bits
in the offline phase and requires 1 round and an amortized
communication of 3ℓ bits in the online phase.
Proof: During the offline phase, each P1, P2, P3 receives
one share of γxy from another party resulting in 1 round and
communication of 3ℓ bits. Also, each party receives a hash
value from P0 in the same round. The values corresponding
to all the multiplication gates can be combined into a single
hash resulting in an overall communication of just three hash
values, which gets amortized. During the online phase, each of
P1, P2, P3 receives one [·]-share of mz − mxmy from another
party resulting in 1 round and a communication of 3ℓ bits.
Also, each party receives a hash value of the same from the
third party. The values corresponding to all the multiplication
gates can be combined into a single hash resulting in amorti-
zation of this cost.
Theorem B.5. Π4PC requires one round with an amortized
communication of 3M ring elements during the offline phase.
In the online phase, Π4PC requires one round with an amor-
tized communication of at most 3I ring elements in the Input-
sharing stage, D rounds with an amortized communication of
3M ring elements for evaluation stage and one round with
an amortized communication of 3O elements for the output-
reconstruction stage.
Proof: The proof follows from Lemmas B.1, B.4 and B.3.
Lemma B.6 (Communication). Protocol ΠfRec (Fig. 5) re-
quires 4 rounds and an amortized communication of 8ℓ bits in
the online phase.
Proof: In the first round, P0 receives a single bit from
parties P1, P2, P3. In the next round, P0 sends back a single
bit to P1, P2, P3. In the third round, P1, P2, P3 mutually ex-
changes the bit received from P0. In the last round, each party
receives the missing share from two other parties resulting in
the communication of 8ℓ bits. In parallel, each party receives
a hash of the missing share from the third party. Note that the
first three rounds can be performed only once, for all the output
wires together, amortizing the corresponding cost. In the last
round, parties can compute a single hash corresponding to all
the output wires resulting in getting this cost amortized over
all the instances.
APPENDIX C
ANALYSIS OF CONVERSIONS
A. Building Blocks
Lemma C.1 (Communication). Protocol ΠvSh (Fig. 7) is non-
interactive in the offline phase and requires 1 round and an
amortized communication of at most 2ℓ bits in the online
phase.
Proof: The cost for the offline phase follows from
Lemma B.1. In the online phase, parties Pi, Pj sends the
masked value to P1, P2, P3. For the case when P0 ∈ {Pi, Pj},
this requires 1 round and a communication of 2ℓ bits. In other
cases, communication of just ℓ bits is required. Note that the
values corresponding to multiple instances of ΠvSh can be
combined into a single hash, resulting in amortization of this
cost.
Lemma C.2 (Communication). Protocol ΠGvSh (Fig. 8) is non-
interactive in the offline phase, while it requires 1 round and
an amortised communication of κ bits in the online phase.
Proof: For the case when P0 along with one of the
garblers P1, P2, P3 owns v, the protocol requires two commit-
ments and one decommitment. ABY3 [5] has shown that the
number of commitments can be limited to 2s, when the number
of values to be shared is larger than the statistical security
parameter s. Consequently, the amortized cost per instance
of ΠGvSh becomes κ bits (where the garbler sends the key K
v
v
to P0). For the case when two of the garblers need to share
multiple values, one garbler can combine all the actual keys
to a single hash and send it to P0, resulting in an amortized
cost of κ bits.
Lemma C.3 (Communication). Protocol ΠDotP (Fig. 9) re-
quires 1 round and an amortized communication of 3ℓ bits
in the offline phase and requires 1 round and an amortized
communication of 3ℓ bits in the online phase.
Proof: The proof follows from Lemma B.4 since the
protocol is similar to ΠMult.
B. Sharing Conversions
We use |Add| and |Sub| to denote the size of garbled
circuits corresponding to two ℓ-bit input adder and subtractor
circuit respectively. We abuse the notation |Decode| to denote
the size of decoding information for the corresponding garbled
circuit. The lemmas in this section provide the amortized cost
and omit the cost of hash values.
Lemma C.4 (Communication). Protocol ΠG2B (Fig. 10) re-
quires 1 round and a communication of κ + 1 + |Decode|
bits in the offline phase, while it requires 1 round and a
communication of 3 bits in the online phase.
Proof: During the offline phase, parties execute one
instance of ΠGvSh and Π
B
vSh resulting in 1 round and a com-
munication of κ + 1 bits (Lemmas C.1 and C.2). Also, the
decoding information for performing an XOR in the garbled
world needs to be communicated to P0. During the online
phase, P0 communicates a single bit to P3. Also, P0 performs
the boolean sharing of the same bit resulting in a total
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communication of 3 bits. The verification by P3 can be pushed
to the next round as long as the values are not revealed in the
next round. Thus parties can proceed with the evaluation after
the first round.
Lemma C.5 (Communication). Protocol ΠG2A (Fig. 11) re-
quires 1 round and a communication of ℓκ + ℓ + |Sub| +
|Decode| bits in the offline phase, while it requires 1 round
and a communication of 3ℓ bits in the online phase.
Proof: The protocol is similar to that of ΠG2B
(Lemma C.4) with the main difference being a garbled sub-
tractor circuit Sub is used for evaluating the final output.
Lemma C.6 (Communication). Protocol ΠB2G (Fig. 12) re-
quires 1 round and a communication of κ bits in the offline
phase, while it requires 1 round and a communication of κ
bits in the online phase.
Proof: The protocol ΠB2G involves the execution of an
instance of protocol ΠGvSh in both the offline and online phases.
The cost follows directly from Lemma C.2.
Lemma C.7 (Communication). Protocol ΠA2G (Fig. 13) re-
quires − rounds and a communication of ℓκ+ |Sub| bits in the
offline phase, while it requires 1 round and a communication
of ℓκ bits in the online phase.
Proof: The protocol can be viewed as ℓ instances of ΠB2G
(Lemma C.6), where each bit of v is converted to its garbled
sharing. Moreover, a garbled subtractor circuit Sub is used to
evaluate the output.
Lemma C.8 (Communication). Protocol ΠA2B (Fig. 14) re-
quires 1 round and a communication of 3ℓ log ℓ + 2ℓ bits in
the offline phase, while it requires 1 + log ℓ rounds and a
communication of 3ℓ log ℓ+ ℓ bits in the online phase.
Proof: The protocol proceeds similarly to that of ΠA2G
apart from the garbled world being replaced with the boolean
world. Parties execute a single instance of ΠBvSh in both the
offline and online phases. This results in one round and a
communication of 2ℓ bits in the offline phase, while it results
in one round and communication of ℓ bits in the online
phases (Lemma C.1). Moreover, parties evaluate a boolean
subtractor circuit Sub (Parallel Prefix Adder version mentioned
in ABY3 [5]) of log ℓ multiplicative depth and contain ℓ log ℓ
AND gates. This results in an additional communication of
3ℓ log ℓ bits in the offline and online phases (Lemma B.4).
Moreover, the online rounds increases from 1 to 1 + log ℓ.
Lemma C.9 (Communication). Protocol ΠBit2A (Fig. 15)
requires 2 rounds and a communication of 3ℓ + 1 bits in the
offline phase, while it requires 1 round and a communication
of 3ℓ bits in the online phase.
Proof: During the offline phase, P0 executes ΠaSh on
u resulting in one round and a communication of 2ℓ bits
(Lemma B.2). This is followed by parties P1, P2, P3 perform-
ing the check to ensure the correctness of sharing done by
P0. During the check, P1 sends one ring element and a bit to
P3, while P2 sends a hash value. This results in an additional
round and an amortized communication of ℓ+ 1 bits.
During the online phase, parties non-interactively generate
the J·K-shares of v. This is followed by one arithmetic multi-
plication, resulting in one round and communication of 3ℓ bits
in the online phase (Lemma B.4). Here, note that the offline
phase for the multiplication is not required, since λv is set to
0 while executing the protocol ΠSh(P1, P2, P3, v), resulting in
γuv to be set to 0.
Lemma C.10 (Communication). Protocol ΠB2A (Fig. 16)
requires 2 rounds and a communication of 3ℓ2 + ℓ bits in the
offline phase, while it requires 1 round and a communication
of 3ℓ bits in the online phase.
Proof: The offline cost follows from that of protocol
ΠBit2A since the offline phase can be viewed as ℓ instances
of that of ΠBit2A (Lemma C.9). During the online phase, every
pair from P1, P2, P3 executes an instance of ΠvSh resulting in
one round and communication of 3ℓ bits (Lemma C.1).
Lemma C.11 (Communication). Protocol ΠBitInj (Fig. 17)
requires 2 rounds and a communication of 6ℓ + 1 bits in the
offline phase, while it requires 1 round and a communication
of 3ℓ bits in the online phase.
Proof: The offline phase of ΠBitInj consists of generating
〈·〉-shares of λb and λbλv. The case for λb is same as that
of ΠBit2A resulting in two rounds and a communication of
3ℓ + 1 bits. In parallel, P0 execute ΠaSh on λbλv resulting
in an additional communication of 2ℓ bits. In order to verify
the correctness of this sharing, P1, P2, P3 performs a check.
During the check, P1 sends one ring element to P3, while
P2 sends a hash value, resulting in an additional amortised
communication of ℓ bits. Thus the offline phase requires two
rounds and an amortised communication of 6ℓ+ 1 bits.
During the online phase, every pair from P1, P2, P3 exe-
cutes an instance of ΠvSh resulting in one round and commu-
nication of 3ℓ bits (Lemma C.1).
Cost Comparison: Table IX provides a comparison of
our sharing conversions with ABY3 [5]. Here, G1 denotes a
two input garbled subtractor circuit, while G2 = Gar(2, Sub, ℓ)
denotes two input garbled subtractor circuit along with its
decoding information. Similarly, G3 = Gar(3, Sub, ℓ) and
G4 = Gar(3,Adder, ℓ) denote three input garbled circuit for
subtraction and addition respectively. Here ℓ denotes the ring
size in bits.
APPENDIX D
ANALYSIS OF ML PROTOCOLS
Lemma D.1 (Correctness). In the offline phase of protocol
ΠMultTr (Fig. 18), if a corrupt P0 generates incorrect Jr
tK
sharing, then the honest evaluators P1, P2, P3 abort.
Proof: To see the correctness, it suffices to show that m1+
m2 = c where m1 = r2− 2
drt2− rd,2+ c and m2 = (r1+ r3)−
2d(rt1 + r
t
3) − (rd,1 + rd,3). Note that r = 2
drt + rd where r
t
denoted the truncated value of r and rd denoted the last d bits
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Conv. Work
Offline Online
R. Comm. R. Comm.
G2B
ABY3 1 κ 1 κ
This 1 κ+ 1 + |Decode| 1 3
G2A
ABY3 1 |G3|+ ℓκ 1 2ℓκ
This 1 ℓκ+ ℓ+ |G2| 1 3ℓ
B2G
ABY3 0 0 1 2κ
This 1 κ 1 κ
A2G
ABY3 1 |G4| 1 2ℓκ
This 1 ℓκ+ |G1| 1 ℓκ
A2B
ABY3 3 12ℓ log ℓ+ 12ℓ 1 + log ℓ 9ℓ log ℓ+ 9ℓ
This 1 3ℓ log ℓ+ 2ℓ 1 + log ℓ 3ℓ log ℓ+ ℓ
Bit2A
ABY3 1 24ℓ 2 18ℓ
This 2 3ℓ+ 1 1 3ℓ
B2A
ABY3 3 12ℓ log ℓ+ 12ℓ 1 + log ℓ 9ℓ log ℓ+ 9ℓ
This 2 3ℓ2 + ℓ 1 3ℓ
BitInj
ABY3 1 36ℓ 3 27ℓ
This 2 6ℓ+ 1 1 3ℓ
Table IX: Sharing conversions of ABY3 and Ours.
of r. Then,
m1 +m2 =
(
r2 − 2
drt2 − rd,2 + c
)
+
(
(r1 + r3)− 2
d(rt1 + r
t
3)− (rd,1 + rd,3)
)
= (r1 + r2 + r3)− 2
d(rt1 + r
t
2 + r
t
3)
− (rd,1 + rd,2 + rd,3) + c
= (r)− (2drt + rd) + c = 0+ c = c
Lemma D.2 (Communication). Protocol ΠMultTr (Fig. 18)
requires 2 rounds and a communication of 6ℓ bits in the offline
phase, while it requires 1 round and a communication of 3ℓ
bits in the online phase.
Proof: During the offline phase, the offline phase of ΠMult
is executed, resulting in one round and communication of
3ℓ bits. In parallel, P0 executes ΠaSh on r
t resulting in an
additional communication of 2ℓ bits (Lemma B.2). To verify
the correctness of this sharing, parties P1, P2, P3 performs a
check, where P1 sends one ring element and hash value to
P2. This results in an additional amortized communication
of ℓ bits. Thus the offline phase requires two rounds and an
amortized communication of 6ℓ bits. The cost for online phase
follows directly from ΠMult (Lemma B.4)
Lemma D.3 (Communication). Protocol ΠBitExt (Fig. 19)
requires 1 round and a communication of 4ℓ + 1 bits in the
offline phase, while it requires 3 rounds and a communication
of 5ℓ+ 2 bits in the online phase.
Proof: During the offline phase, parties execute one
instance each of ΠvSh and Π
B
vSh resulting in one round and
a communication of ℓ+1 bits (Lemma C.1). Also, the offline
phase for multiplication is performed resulting in an additional
communication of 3ℓ bits.
During the online phase, parties first execute an arithmetic
multiplication, resulting in one round and communication of 3ℓ
bits (Lemma B.4). The value rv is reconstructed towards both
P0 and P3, resulting in an additional round and an amortized
communication of 2ℓ bits. This is followed by the last round,
where parties execute one instance of ΠBvSh resulting in a
communication of 2 bits. Thus the online phase requires three
rounds and an amortized communication of 5ℓ+ 2 bits.
Lemma D.4 (Communication). Protocol ReLU (Πrelu) requires
3 rounds and a communication of 8ℓ + 2 bits in the offline
phase, while it requires 4 rounds and a communication of 8ℓ+2
bits in the online phase.
Proof: The cost follows directly from Lemmas D.3 and
C.11.
Lemma D.5 (Communication). Protocol Sigmoid (Πsig) re-
quires 3 rounds and a communication of 15ℓ + 7 bits in the
offline phase, while it requires 5 rounds and a communication
of 16ℓ+ 7 bits in the online phase.
Proof: The cost follows directly from Lemmas D.3, B.4,
C.9 and C.11.
Cost Comparison: Table X provides a comparison of
our work with ABY3 [5], in terms of ML protocols and special
conversions.
Conv. Work
Offline Online
R. Comm. R. Comm.
ΠMultTr
ABY3 2ℓ− 2 96ℓ− 42d− 84 1 12ℓ
This 2 6ℓ 1 3ℓ
ΠBitExt
ABY3 1 24ℓ log ℓ log ℓ 18ℓ log ℓ
This 1 4ℓ+ 1 3 5ℓ+ 2
ReLU
ABY3 3 60ℓ 3 + log ℓ 45ℓ
This 3 8ℓ+ 2 4 8ℓ+ 2
Sigmoid
ABY3 3 108ℓ+ 12 4 + log ℓ 81ℓ+ 9
This 3 15ℓ+ 7 5 16ℓ+ 7
Table X: ML conversions of ABY3 and Ours. d denotes the
number of features
APPENDIX E
BENCHMARKING
A. Motivating 4PC
In this section, we justify the reason for operating in
the 4PC setting over the 3PC setting through the lens of
benchmarking and practical efficiency. We begin with the
comparison of our 4PC secret sharing scheme with that of
Gordon et al. [26], which shows the reason we built a new 4PC.
In Section E-A2 we compare the efficiency of our framework
with ABY3. Since machine learning models take a long time
to train, monetary cost becomes an important factor to consider
when building PPML protocols, as shown in [27].
Monetary cost is computed by calculating the total running
time for each of the servers and the cost of hiring them, which
is based upon the computing power of the server. Total running
time is the total time taken for the evaluation phase, which
excludes the input sharing and reconstruction phase. So, if
we have a protocol that communicates very less but the total
running time for the servers is high due to the computation, the
monetary cost will also be high. We compare the total running
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times of our protocol against the others to show that we have
a better balance in terms of computation and communication,
making our monetary cost lower than the rest.
Ref. P0 P1 P2 P3 Total
Gordon 7.84 3.13 7.34 3.21 21.52
This 0.00 6.19 6.19 3.81 16.19
Table XI: Total Online Runtime (in seconds) of Gordon et al. and
This for evaluation on an AES-128 circuit (lower = better) over WAN.
1) Comparison with the protocol of Gordon et al. [26]:
In Table XI, we compare the total online runtime of our 4PC
protocol with that of Gordon et al. [26] for evaluating an AES-
128 [58] circuit. As evident from the table, P0 does not have
to be active during the online phase, except for the sharing
and the reconstruction phase. This means we can shut down
the server that corresponds to P0 for the entirety of the online
evaluation phase, saving a lot in terms of monetary cost. The
preprocessing phase for both protocols requires just 1 round
of interaction.
2) Motivation of 4PC for ML: Here, we argue that even
though we operate in the 4PC setting, meaning we have 4
servers active instead of 3 as in ABY3, our total monetary
cost is still lower than that of ABY3. Table XII shows that
our total runtime for both training and prediction phases in
the malicious case is lower for all the algorithms considered.
For the training phase, we use a batch size of 128. The number
of features for both training and prediction is 784.
Phase Ref.
Linear
Regression
Logistic
Regression
NN CNN
Training
(s)
ABY3 2.01 8.92 38.41 41.45
This 0.92 3.76 13.07 13.19
Prediction
(s)
ABY3 1.45 8.36 21.12 22.48
This 0.44 2.74 6.90 6.93
Table XII: Total Online Runtime (in seconds) of ABY3 (Malicious)
and This for Training and Prediction of Linear, Logistic, NN, and
CNN models for d = 784 (lower = better) over a WAN setting.
B. Comparison with the ML framework of ABY3 [5] in the
semi-honest setting
We compare the performance of our protocol with the semi-
honest version of ABY3, giving them an advantage in terms of
the threat model. We use ABY3S to denote the ABY3 protocol
in the semi-honest setting. Our performance is the same for
linear regression but as the protocols get more complex, the
difference in performance increases in our favour. This is
because in linear regression though we have the additional
overhead of a hash, the cost is amortized, making our cost
the same as ABY3S. For the other three algorithms, however,
we outperform ABY3S due to our efficient protocols for bit
extraction, bit injection, and Bit2A. Although we are worse
than ABY3 in the offline phase due to our preprocessing for
multiplication, our online phase is a lot more efficient for both
training and prediction phases.
Algorithm Ref. LAN (#it/sec) WAN (#it/min)
Linear
Regression
ABY3S 1098.90 195.13
This 1098.90 195.13
Logistic
Regression
ABY3S 90.29 35.48
This 307.41 55.75
Neural
Networks
ABY3S 1.01 8.13
This 23.00 13.94
CNN
ABY3S 0.37 7.13
This 10.46 13.86
Table XIII: Comparison of Online Phase of ABY3 (Semi-Honest)
and This for ML Training (higher = better)
In Table XIII, we compare the online phase of both
protocols for ML training, in terms of the number of iterations
per second they can process. In Table XIV and Table XV
we compare the online phase for prediction through two
benchmarking units, one being the runtime and the other being
the throughput, which is the number of queries we can process
per second.
Network Ref.
Linear
Regression
Logistic
Regression
NN CNN
LAN
(ms)
ABY3S 0.30 9.14 480.81 1185.70
This 0.30 2.55 17.17 39.63
WAN
(s)
ABY3S 0.16 1.54 4.07 4.47
This 0.16 0.93 2.31 2.31
Table XIV: Online Runtime of ABY3 (Semi-honest) and This for
Secure Prediction of Linear, Logistic, NN, and CNN models for d =
784 (lower = better)
Algorithm Ref.
LAN
(queries/sec)
WAN
(queries/min)
Linear
Regression
ABY3S 106666.67 12488.62
This 106666.67 12488.62
Logistic
Regression
ABY3S 3512.62 1248.86
This 12549.02 2081.46
Neural
Networks
ABY3S 66.41 211.18
This 153.39 368.13
CNN
ABY3S 21.47 51.54
This 37.43 89.84
Table XV: Comparison of Online TP of ABY3 (Semi-Honest) and
This for Secure Prediction (higher = better)
APPENDIX F
SECURITY OF OUR CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, we prove the security of our Π4PC protocol
in the {Fsetup,FZero}-hybrid model, using the real world-ideal
world paradigm. The ideal world functionality that realises
Π4PC is given in Fig. 23.
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F4PC interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S and is
parameterized by a 4-ary function f , represented by a publicly
known arithmetic circuit ckt over Z2ℓ .
Input: Upon receiving the input x, . . . , xI from the respective
parties in P , do the following: if (Input, ∗) message was received
from Pi corresponding to xj , then ignore. Otherwise record x
′
j = xj
internally. If x′j 6= Z2ℓ , consider x
′
j = abort.
Output to adversary: If there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , I} such
that x′j = abort, send (Output,⊥) to all the parties. Else, send
(Output, (y1, . . . , yO)) to the adversary S , where (y1, . . . , yO) =
f(x′1, . . . , x
′
I).
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I}) from
adversary S , where {I} denotes a subset of the honest parties.
If an honest party belongs to I , send (Output,⊥), else send
(Output, (y1, . . . , yO)).
Functionality F4PC
Figure 23: Ideal world 4PC functionality
We begin with the case when P0 is corrupted.
Theorem F.1. In {Fsetup,FZero}-hybrid model, Π4PC securely
realizes the functionality F4PC against a static, malicious
adversary A, who corrupts P0.
Proof: Let A be a real-world adversary corrupting the
distributor P0 during the protocol Π4PC. We present an ideal-
world adversary (simulator) S4PC for A in Fig. 24 that simu-
lates messages for corrupt P0. The only communication to P0
is during the output-reconstruction stage in the online phase.
S4PC can easily simulate these messages, with the knowledge
of function output and the masks corresponding to the circuit-
output wires.
The simulator plays the role of the honest parties P1, P2, P3 and
simulates each step of Π4PC to corrupt P0 as follows and finally
outputs A’s output. The simulator initializes a boolean variable
flag = 0, which indicates whether an honest party aborts during
the protocol.
Offline Phase: S4PC emulates Fsetup and gives the keys
(k01, k02, k03, k012, k013, k023 and kP) to P0. By emulating Fsetup,
it learns the λ-masks for all the wires in ckt.
– Sharing Circuit-input Values: Here the simulator has to do
nothing, as the offline phase involves no communication.
– Gate Evaluation: No simulation is needed for the offline phase
of an addition gate. For a multiplication gate g, the simulator
emulates FZero and gives A,B,Γ to P0. It then receives hash
of γxy,1, γxy,2 and γxy,3 from P0 on behalf of P2, P3 and P1
respectively. S4PC computes γxy,i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and sets
flag = 1, if any of the hash values received is inconsistent with
the values computed.
– Output Reconstruction: Here the simulator has to do nothing,
as the offline phase involves no communication.
If flag = 1, S4PC invokes F4PC with input ⊥ on behalf of P0.
Online Phase:
– Sharing Circuit-input Values: For every input vj of P0, S4PC
receives mvj of behalf of P1, P2, P3. S4PC sets flag = 1 if the
received values mismatch. Else, it computes the input vj using
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mvj and the λ-masks obtained in the offline phase.
– Gate Evaluation: No simulation is needed for the online phase
of both addition and multiplication gates.
– Obtaining function outputs: If flag = 1, S4PC invokes F4PC with
input ⊥ on behalf of P0. Else it sends inputs {vj} extracted
on behalf of P0 to F4PC and receives the function outputs
y1, . . . , yO.
– Output Reconstruction: For each output yj for j ∈ 1, . . . ,O,
S4PC computes myj = yj + λyj , and sends myj and H(myj ) to
P0 on behalf of P1 and P2 respectively. In parallel, he receives
H(λyj ,i) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} from P0, on behalf of P1, P2, P3. S4PC
initializes the set I to ∅. Pi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is added to I , if
hash of λyj ,i mismatches with the corresponding hash received
from P0. S4PC then sends I to F4PC and terminates.
Figure 24: Simulator for the case of corrupt P0
The proof now simply follows from the fact that simulated
view and real-world view of the adversary are computationally
indistinguishable.
We next consider the case, when the adversary corrupts
one of the evaluators, say P1. The cases of corrupt P2 and P3
are handled symmetrically.
Theorem F.2. In the {Fsetup,FZero}-hybrid model, Π4PC se-
curely realizes the functionality F4PC against a static, mali-
cious adversary A, who corrupts P1.
Proof: Let A be a real-world adversary corrupting the
evaluator P1 during the protocol Π4PC. We now present the
steps of the ideal-world adversary (simulator) S4PC for A for
this case in Fig. 25.
The simulator plays the role of the honest parties P0, P2, P3 and
simulates each step of Π4PC to corrupt P1 as follows and finally
outputs A’s output. The simulator initializes a boolean variable
flag = 0, which indicates whether an honest party aborts during
the protocol.
Offline Phase: S4PC emulates Fsetup and gives the keys
(k01, k12, k13, k012, k013, k123 and kP) to P1. By emulating Fsetup,
it learns the λ-masks for all the wires in ckt.
– Sharing Circuit-input Values: Here the simulator has to do
nothing, as the offline phase involves no communication.
– Gate Evaluation: No simulation is needed for the offline
phase of an addition gate. For a multiplication gate g =
(wx,wy,wz,×), the simulator emulates FZero and gives A to
P1. S4PC computes γxy,i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and sends γxy,3 and
H(γxy,3) to P1 on behalf of P2 and P0 respectively. It receives
γxy,2 from P1 on behalf of P3 and sets flag = 1, if the received
value is inconsistent.
– Output Reconstruction: Here the simulator has to do nothing,
as the offline phase involves no communication.
If flag = 1, S4PC invokes F4PC with input ⊥ on behalf of P0.
Online Phase:
– Sharing Circuit-input Values: For every input vj of P1, S4PC
receives mvj of behalf of P2 and P3. S4PC sets flag = 1 if
the received values mismatch. Else, it computes the input vj
using mvj and the λ-masks obtained in the offline phase. For
every input vk of Pi for i ∈ {0, 2, 3}, S4PC sets vk = 0 and
Simulator S4PC
20
sends mvk = 0 + λvk to P1 on behalf of Pi. S4PC performs the
exchange of hash of mvk honestly.
– Gate Evaluation: No simulation is needed for the online phase
of addition gates. For a multiplication gate g = (wx,wy,wz,×),
S4PC computes and sends [m
′
z]1 and H([m
′
z]1) to P1 on behalf
of P2 and P3 respectively. It receives H([m
′
z]2) and [m
′
z]3 from
P1 on behalf of P2 and P3 respectively.S4PC sets flag = 1, if
any of the received values are inconsistent.
– Obtaining function outputs: If flag = 1, S4PC invokes F4PC with
input ⊥ on behalf of P1. Else it sends inputs {vj} extracted
on behalf of P1 to F4PC and receives the function outputs
y1, . . . , yO.
– Output Reconstruction: For each output yj for j ∈ 1, . . . ,O,
S4PC computes λyj = myj −yj , and sends λyj and H(λyj ) to P1
on behalf of P2 and P0 respectively. In parallel, it receives λyj ,3
and H(myj ) from P1 on behalf of P3 and P0 respectively. P0 is
added to I , if hash of myj mismatches with the corresponding
hash received from P1. Similarly, P3 is added to I , if λyj ,3
mismatches with the corresponding value received from P1. S4PC
then sends I to F4PC and terminates.
Figure 25: Simulator for the case of corrupt P1
A. Security Proof in Detail
This section covers the security proofs for most of our
constructions. The proofs for the rest can be easily derived.
The proofs use the real-world/ideal-world paradigm in which
A is the adversary in the real-world and S is the simulator
for the ideal-world, which acts as the honest parties in the
protocol and simulates messages received by A. The simulator
maintains a flag which is set to 0 at the start of the protocol.
If an honest party abort, the flag is set to 1. Simulator for a
particular protocol is represented as S with the protocol name
as the subscript.
The simulation for a circuit ckt proceeds as follows: We
start with the input sharing phase, and S sets the input of
the honest parties to 0. The simulator can extract the input
of the A from the sharing protocol ΠSh, details of which are
provided in the simulation for ΠSh. Doing so gives the S all
the inputs for the entire circuit, which means it can compute
all the intermediate values and the output of the circuit. As
we will see later, S will use this information to simulate each
component of a circuit ckt.
For each of the constructions, we provide simulation proof
for the case of corrupt P0 and P1. The cases of corrupt P2
and P3 follows similar to that of P1.
a) Sharing Protocol: The ideal functionality realising
protocol ΠSh is presented in Fig. 26.
FSh interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S . FSh
receives the input v from party Pi while it receives ⊥ from the
other parties. If v = ⊥, then send ⊥ to every party, else proceed
with the computation.
Computation of output: Randomly select λv,1, λv,2, λv,3 from
Z2ℓ and set mv = v+λv,1+λv,2+λv,3. The output shares are set
as:
Functionality FSh
JvKP0 = (λv,1, λv,2, λv,3) JvKP1 = (mv, λv,2, λv,3)
JvKP2 = (mv, λv,3, λv,1) JvKP3 = (mv, λv,1, λv,2)
Output to adversary: If S sends abort, then send (Output,⊥)
to all the parties. Otherwise, send (Output, JvKS) to the adversary
S , where JvKS denotes the share of v corresponding to the corrupt
party.
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I}) from
adversary S , where {I} denotes a subset of the honest parties. If
an honest parties Pi belongs to I , send (Output,⊥), else send
(Output, JvKi), where JvKi denotes the share of v corresponding
to the honest party Pi.
Figure 26: Functionality for protocol ΠSh
The simulator for the case of corrupt P0 appears in
Fig. 27.
Offline Phase: SSh emulates Fsetup and gives the keys
(k01, k02, k03, k012, k013, k023 and kP) to A. By emulating
Fsetup, it learns the λ-values corresponding to input v.
– If Pi = P0, SSh computes λv,j for j ∈ 1, 2, 3 on behalf of each
Pj using the shared key.
– If Pi = Pk for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, SSh computes λv,k using the
key kP . In addition, the λv-shares corresponding to the honest
parties are computed honestly by SSh.
Online Phase:
– If Pi = P0, SSh receives mv of behalf of P1, P2, P3. SSh sets
flag = 1 if the received values mismatch. Else, it computes the
input v = mv − λv,1 − λv,2 − λv,3.
– If Pi 6= P0, SSh sets v = 0 by assigning mv = λv,1+λv,2+λv,3.
If flag = 0 and Pi = P0, SSh invokes FSh with input v on behalf
of P0. Else it invokes FSh with input ⊥ on behalf of P0.
Simulator SSh
Figure 27: Simulator SSh for the case of corrupt P0
The simulator for the case of corrupt P1 appears in
Fig. 28.
Offline Phase: SSh emulates Fsetup and gives the keys
(k01, k12, k13, k012, k013, k123 and kP) to A. By emulating
Fsetup, it learns the λ-values corresponding to input v.
– If Pi = P1, SSh computes λv,1 using the key kP .
– If Pi = Pk for k ∈ {0, 2, 3}, the λv-shares corresponding to
the honest parties are computed honestly by SSh.
Online Phase:
– If Pi = P1, SSh receives mv of behalf of P2, P3. SSh sets
flag = 1 if the received values mismatch. Else, it computes the
input v = mv − λv,1 − λv,2 − λv,3.
– If Pi 6= P1, SSh sets v = 0 by assigning mv = λv,1+λv,2+λv,3.
SSh sends mv to P1 on behalf of the sender
If flag = 0 and Pi = P1, SSh invokes FSh with input v on behalf
Simulator SSh
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of P1. Else it invokes FSh with input ⊥ on behalf of P1.
Figure 28: Simulator SSh for the case of corrupt P1
b) Verifiable Arithmetic/Boolean Sharing: The ideal
functionality realising protocol ΠvSh is presented in Fig. 29.
FvSh interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S . FSh
receives the input v from parties Pi, Pj while it receives ⊥ from
the other parties. If the received values mismatch, then send ⊥ to
every party, else proceed with the computation.
Computation of output: Randomly select λv,1, λv,2, λv,3 from
Z2ℓ and set mv = v+λv,1+λv,2+λv,3. The output shares are set
as:
JvKP0 = (λv,1, λv,2, λv,3) JvKP1 = (mv, λv,2, λv,3)
JvKP2 = (mv, λv,3, λv,1) JvKP3 = (mv, λv,1, λv,2)
Output to adversary: If S sends abort, then send (Output,⊥)
to all the parties. Otherwise, send (Output, JvKS) to the adversary
S , where JvKS denotes the share of v corresponding to the corrupt
party.
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I}) from
adversary S , where {I} denotes a subset of the honest parties. If
an honest parties Pi belongs to I , send (Output,⊥), else send
(Output, JvKi), where JvKi denotes the share of v corresponding
to the honest party Pi.
Functionality FvSh
Figure 29: Functionality for protocol ΠvSh
The simulator for the case of corrupt P0 appears in
Fig. 30.
Offline Phase: The simulation for the offline phase is similar to
that of ΠSh(Pi, v) for the case of corrupt P0 (Fig. 27).
Online Phase: SvSh proceeds similar to that of ΠSh(Pi, v) for the
case of corrupt P0 (Fig. 27). In addition, if Pj = P0, it receives
H(mv) from A on behalf of P1, P2, and P3. SvSh sets flag = 1 if
the received values mismatch.
If flag = 0 and Pj = P0, SvSh invokes FvSh with input v on behalf
of P0. Else it invokes FvSh with input ⊥ on behalf of P0.
Simulator SvSh
Figure 30: Simulator SvSh for the case of corrupt P0
The simulator for the case of corrupt P1 appears in
Fig. 31.
Offline Phase: The simulation for the offline phase is similar to
that of ΠSh(Pi, v) for the case of corrupt P1 (Fig. 28).
Online Phase: SvSh proceeds similar to that of ΠSh(Pi, v) for the
case of corrupt P1 (Fig. 28). In addition, if Pj = P1, it receives
H(mv) from A on behalf of P2, and P3. SvSh sets flag = 1 if the
received values mismatch.
Simulator SvSh
If flag = 0 and Pi = P1, SvSh invokes FvSh with input v on behalf
of P1. Else it invokes FvSh with input ⊥ on behalf of P1.
Figure 31: Simulator SvSh for the case of corrupt P1
c) Reconstruction Protocol: The ideal functionality re-
alising protocolΠRec is presented in Fig. 32.
FRec interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S . FRec
receives the J·K-shares of value v from party Pi for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
The shares are
JvKP0 = (λ
′
v,1, λ
′
v,2, λ
′
v,3) JvKP1 = (m
′
v, λ
′′
v,2, λ
′′
v,3)
JvKP2 = (m
′′
v , λ
′′′
v,3, λ
′′
v,1) JvKP3 = (m
′′′
v , λ
′′′
v,1, λ
′′′
v,2)
FRec sends ⊥ to every party if either of the following condition
is met: i) λ′v,1 6= λ
′′
v,1 6= λ
′′′
v,1, ii) λ
′
v,2 6= λ
′′
v,2 6= λ
′′′
v,2, iii) λ
′
v,3 6=
λ′′v,3 6= λ
′′′
v,3 or iv) m
′
v 6= m
′′
v 6= m
′′′
v . Else it proceeds with the
computation.
Computation of output: Set v = mv − λv,1 − λv,2 − λv,3.
Output to adversary: If S sends abort, then send (Output,⊥)
to all the parties. Otherwise, send (Output, v) to the adversary S .
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I}) from
adversary S , where {I} denotes a subset of the honest parties.
If an honest party Pi belongs to I , send (Output,⊥), else send
(Output, v).
Functionality FRec
Figure 32: Functionality for protocol ΠRec
The simulator for the case of corrupt P0 appears in Fig. 33.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, S knows all of
the intermediate values and the output of the ckt. S uses this
information to simulate the ΠRec protocol.
Online Phase:
– SRec computes mv = v + λv,1 + λv,2 + λv,3. It then sends mv
and H(mv) to A on behalf of P1 and P2 respectively.
– SRec receives H(λ
′
v,1),H(λ
′
v,2) and H(λ
′
v,1) from A on behalf
of P1, P2 and P3 respectively. SRec sets flag = 1 if any of the
received hash values is inconsistent.
If flag = 0, SRec invokes FRec with input (λv,1, λv,2, λv,3) on
behalf of P0. Else it invokes FRec with input ⊥ on behalf of P0.
Simulator SRec
Figure 33: Simulator SRec for the case of corrupt P0
The simulator for the case of corrupt P1 appears in
Fig. 34.
Online Phase:
– SRec sends λv,1 and H(λv,1) to A on behalf of P2 and P0
respectively.
– SRec receives λ
′
v,3 and H(m
′
v) from A on behalf of P3 and P0
respectively. SRec sets flag = 1 if any of the received values is
inconsistent.
Simulator SRec
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If flag = 0, SRec invokes FRec with input (mv, λv,2, λv,3) on behalf
of P1. Else it invokes FRec with input ⊥ on behalf of P1.
Figure 34: Simulator SRec for the case of corrupt P1
d) Multiplication: The ideal functionality realising pro-
tocol ΠMult is presented in Fig. 35.
FMult interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S . FMult
receives J·K-shares of values x and y from the parties as input. If
FMult receives ⊥ from S , then send ⊥ to every party, else proceed
with the computation.
Computation of output: Compute x = mx − λx,1 − λx,2 −
λx,3, y = my−λy,1−λy,2−λy,3 and set z = xy. Randomly select
λz,1, λz,2, λz,3 from Z2ℓ and set mz = z+ λz,1 + λz,2 + λz,3. The
output shares are set as:
JzKP0 = (λz,1, λz,2, λz,3) JzKP1 = (mz, λz,2, λz,3)
JzKP2 = (mz, λz,3, λz,1) JzKP3 = (mz, λz,1, λz,2)
Output to adversary: If S sends abort, then send (Output,⊥)
to all the parties. Otherwise, send (Output, JzKS) to the adversary
S , where JzKS denotes the share of z corresponding to the corrupt
party.
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I}) from
adversary S , where {I} denotes a subset of the honest parties.
If an honest party Pi belongs to I , send (Output,⊥), else send
(Output, JzKi), where JzKi denotes the share of z corresponding to
the honest party Pi.
Functionality FMult
Figure 35: Functionality for protocol ΠMult
The simulator for the case of corrupt P0 appears in
Fig. 36.
Offline Phase:
– SMult samples λz,j for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} honestly using the shared
keys obtained.
– SMult emulates FZero functionality and gives the values A,B,
and Γ to A.
– SMult receives H(γxy,1),H(γxy,2) and H(γxy,3) fromA on behalf
of P2, P3 and P1 respectively. SMult sets flag = 1 if any of the
received values is inconsistent.
Online Phase: There is nothing to simulate as P0 has no role
during the online phase.
If flag = 0, SMult invokes FMult with input (JxKP0 , JyKP0) on behalf
of P0. Else it invokes FMult with input ⊥ on behalf of P0.
Simulator SMult
Figure 36: Simulator for the case of corrupt P0
The simulator for the case of corrupt P1 appears in
Fig. 37.
Offline Phase:
– SMult samples λz,j for j ∈ {2, 3} honestly using the shared
keys obtained.
– SMult emulates FZero functionality and gives the value A to A.
– SMult sends γxy,3 and H(γxy,3) to A on behalf of P2 and P0
respectively. It receives γxy,2 from A on behalf of P3 and sets
flag = 1 if the received value is inconsistent.
Online Phase:
– SMult simulates the computation of m
′
z shares honestly on behalf
of P2 and P3.
– SMult sends m
′
z,1 and H(m
′
z,1) to A on behalf of P2 and P3
respectively. It receives m′z,3 and H(m
′
z,2) from A on behalf of
P3 and P2 respectively. SMult sets flag = 1 if any of the received
values is inconsistent.
If flag = 0, SMult invokes FMult with input (JxKP1 , JyKP1) on behalf
of P1. Else it invokes FMult with input ⊥ on behalf of P1.
Simulator SMult
Figure 37: Simulator for the case of corrupt P1
e) Dot Product: The ideal functionality realising pro-
tocol ΠDotP is presented in Fig. 38.
FDotP interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S . FDotP
receives J·K-shares of vectors ~x and ~y from the parties as input.
Here ~x and ~y are d-length vectors. If FDotP receives ⊥ from S ,
then send ⊥ to every party, else proceed with the computation.
Computation of output: Compute xi = mxi − λxi,1 − λxi,2 −
λxi,3, yi = myi − λyi,1 − λyi,2 − λyi,3 for i ∈ [d] and set z =∑d
i=1 xiyi. Randomly select λz,1, λz,2, λz,3 from Z2ℓ and set mz =
z+ λz,1 + λz,2 + λz,3. The output shares are set as:
JzKP0 = (λz,1, λz,2, λz,3) JzKP1 = (mz, λz,2, λz,3)
JzKP2 = (mz, λz,3, λz,1) JzKP3 = (mz, λz,1, λz,2)
Output to adversary: If S sends abort, then send (Output,⊥)
to all the parties. Otherwise, send (Output, JzKS) to the adversary
S , where JzKS denotes the share of z corresponding to the corrupt
party.
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I}) from
adversary S , where {I} denotes a subset of the honest parties.
If an honest party Pi belongs to I , send (Output,⊥), else send
(Output, JzKi), where JzKi denotes the share of z corresponding to
the honest party Pi.
Functionality FDotP
Figure 38: Functionality for protocol ΠSh
The simulator for the case of corrupt P0 appears in
Fig. 39.
Offline Phase:
– SDotP samples λz,j for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} honestly using the shared
keys obtained.
– SDotP emulates FZero functionality and gives the values A,B,
Simulator SDotP
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and Γ to A.
– SDotP receives H(γxy,1),H(γxy,2) and H(γxy,3) from A on
behalf of P2, P3 and P1 respectively. SDotP sets flag = 1 if
any of the received values is inconsistent.
Online Phase: There is nothing to simulate as P0 has no role
during the online phase.
If flag = 0, SDotP invokes FDotP with input ({JxiKP0 , JyiKP0}i∈[d])
on behalf of P0. Else it invokes FDotP with input ⊥ on behalf of
P0.
Figure 39: Simulator for the case of corrupt P0
The simulator for the case of corrupt P1 appears in
Fig. 40.
Offline Phase:
– SDotP samples λz,j for j ∈ {2, 3} honestly using the shared
keys obtained.
– SDotP emulates FZero functionality and gives the value A to A.
– SDotP sends γxy,3 and H(γxy,3) to A on behalf of P2 and P0
respectively. It receives γxy,2 from A on behalf of P3 and sets
flag = 1 if the received value is inconsistent.
Online Phase:
– SDotP simulates the computation of m
′
z shares honestly on
behalf of P2 and P3.
– SDotP sends m
′
z,1 and H(m
′
z,1) to A on behalf of P2 and P3
respectively. It receives m′z,3 and H(m
′
z,2) from A on behalf of
P3 and P2 respectively. SDotP sets flag = 1 if any of the received
values is inconsistent.
If flag = 0, SDotP invokes FDotP with input ({JxiKP1 , JyiKP1}i∈[d])
on behalf of P1. Else it invokes FDotP with input ⊥ on behalf of
P1.
Simulator SDotP
Figure 40: Simulator for the case of corrupt P1
f) Bit to Arithmetic Sharing (Bit2A): The ideal func-
tionality realising protocol ΠBit2A is presented in Fig. 41.
FBit2A interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S . FBit2A
receives J·KB-share of a bit b from the parties as input. If FBit2A
receives ⊥ from S , then send ⊥ to every party, else proceed with
the computation.
Computation of output: Compute b = mb⊕λb,1⊕λb,2⊕λb,3.
Let b′ denotes the value of bit b over an arithmetic ring Z2ℓ .
Randomly select λ′b,1, λ
′
b,2, λ
′
b,3 from Z2ℓ and set m
′
b = b
′+λ′b,1+
λ′b,2 + λ
′
b,3. The output shares are set as:
JbK′P0 = (λ
′
b,1, λ
′
b,2, λ
′
b,3) JbK
′
P1
= (m′b, λ
′
b,2, λ
′
b,3)
JbK′P2 = (m
′
b, λ
′
b,3, λ
′
b,1) JbK
′
P3
= (m′b, λ
′
b,1, λ
′
b,2)
Output to adversary: If S sends abort, then send (Output,⊥)
to all the parties. Otherwise, send (Output, Jb′KS) to the adversary
Functionality FBit2A
S , where Jb′KS denotes the share of b
′ corresponding to the corrupt
party.
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I}) from
adversary S , where {I} denotes a subset of the honest parties.
If an honest party Pi belongs to I , send (Output,⊥), else send
(Output, Jb′Ki), where Jb
′Ki denotes the share of b
′ corresponding
to the honest party Pi.
Figure 41: Functionality for protocol ΠBit2A
The simulator for the case of corrupt P0 appears in
Fig. 42.
Offline Phase:
– Corresponding to the invocation of ΠaSh(P0, u) protocol, SBit2A
receives v3 from A on behalf of both P1 and P2. SBit2A sets
flag = 1 if the received values mismatch.
– SBit2A performs the check honestly and sets flag = 1 if the
verification fails.
Online Phase: The steps corresponding to ΠvSh and ΠMult are
simulated similar to SvSh (Fig. 30) and SMult (Fig. 36) respectively,
for the case of corrupt P0.
If flag = 0, SBit2A invokes FBit2A with input (JbK
B
P0
) on behalf of
P0. Else it invokes FBit2A with input ⊥ on behalf of P0.
Simulator SBit2A
Figure 42: Simulator for the case of corrupt P0
The simulator for the case of corrupt P1 appears in
Fig. 43.
Offline Phase:
– Corresponding to the invocation of ΠaSh(P0, u) protocol, SBit2A
sends v3 to A on behalf of P0. It then sends H(v3) to A on
behalf of P2 and receives H(v
′
3) back. SBit2A sets flag = 1 if it
receives inconsistent hash value.
– SBit2A receives (x1, y1) from A on behalf of P3, performs the
check honestly and sets flag = 1 if the verification fails.
Online Phase: The steps corresponding to ΠvSh and ΠMult are
simulated similar to SvSh (Fig. 31) and SMult (Fig. 37) respectively,
for the case of corrupt P1.
If flag = 0, SBit2A invokes FBit2A with input (JbK
B
P1
) on behalf of
P1. Else it invokes FBit2A with input ⊥ on behalf of P1.
Simulator SBit2A
Figure 43: Simulator for the case of corrupt P1
g) Bit Injection (BitInj): The ideal functionality realis-
ing protocol ΠBitInj is presented in Fig. 44.
FBitInj interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S . FBitInj
receives (JbKB, JvK) from the parties as input. If FBitInj receives
⊥ from S , then send ⊥ to every party, else proceed with the
computation.
Functionality FBitInj
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Computation of output: Compute b = mb ⊕ λb,1 ⊕ λb,2 ⊕
λb,3, v = mv − λv,1 − λv,2 − λv,3 and set (bv) = b · v. Randomly
select λ(bv),1, λ(bv),2, λ(bv),3 from Z2ℓ and set m(bv) = (bv) +
λ(bv),1 + λ(bv),2 + λ(bv),3. The output shares are set as:
J(bv)KP0 = (λ(bv),1, λ(bv),2, λ(bv),3)
J(bv)KP1 = (m(bv), λ(bv),2, λ(bv),3)
J(bv)KP2 = (m(bv), λ(bv),3, λ(bv),1)
J(bv)KP3 = (m(bv), λ(bv),1, λ(bv),2)
Output to adversary: If S sends abort, then send (Output,⊥)
to all the parties. Otherwise, send (Output, J(bv)KS) to the adver-
sary S , where J(bv)KS denotes the share of (bv) corresponding to
the corrupt party.
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I}) from
adversary S , where {I} denotes a subset of the honest parties.
If an honest party Pi belongs to I , send (Output,⊥), else
send (Output, J(bv)Ki), where J(bv)Ki denotes the share of (bv)
corresponding to the honest party Pi.
Figure 44: Functionality for protocol ΠBitInj
The simulator for the case of corrupt P0 appears in
Fig. 45.
Offline Phase:
– Corresponding to the invocation of ΠaSh(P0, yj) protocol, SBitInj
receives yj,3 from A on behalf of both P1 and P2. SBitInj sets
flag = 1 if the received values mismatch.
– SBitInj performs the check honestly and sets flag = 1 if the
verification fails.
Online Phase: The steps corresponding to ΠvSh are simulated
similar to SvSh (Fig. 30), for the case of corrupt P0.
If flag = 0, SBitInj invokes FBitInj with input (JbK
B
P0
, JvKP0) on
behalf of P0. Else it invokes FBitInj with input ⊥ on behalf of P0.
Simulator SBitInj
Figure 45: Simulator for the case of corrupt P0
The simulator for the case of corrupt P1 appears in
Fig. 46.
Offline Phase:
– Corresponding to the invocation of ΠaSh(P0, u) protocol, SBitInj
sends yj,3 to A on behalf of P0. It then sends H(yj,3) to A on
behalf of P2 and receives H(y
′
j,3) back. SBitInj sets flag = 1 if it
receives inconsistent hash value.
– SBitInj emulates FZero functionality and gives A to A.
– SBitInj receives z2 from A on behalf of P3, performs the check
honestly and sets flag = 1 if the verification fails.
Online Phase: The steps corresponding to ΠvSh are simulated
similar to SvSh (Fig. 31), for the case of corrupt P1.
If flag = 0, SBitInj invokes FBitInj with input (JbK
B
P1
, JvKP1) on
behalf of P1. Else it invokes FBitInj with input ⊥ on behalf of P1.
Simulator SBitInj
Figure 46: Simulator for the case of corrupt P1
h) Multiplication with Truncation: The ideal func-
tionality realising protocol ΠMultTr is presented in Fig. 47.
FMultTr interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S . FMultTr
receives J·K-shares of values x and y from the parties as input. If
FMultTr receives ⊥ from S , then send ⊥ to every party, else proceed
with the computation.
Computation of output: Compute x = mx − λx,1 − λx,2 −
λx,3, y = my − λy,1 − λy,2 − λy,3 and set z
t = (xy)t. Randomly
select λzt,1, λzt,2, λzt,3 from Z2ℓ and set mzt = z
t+λzt,1+λzt,2+
λzt,3. The output shares are set as:
JztKP0 = (λzt,1, λzt,2, λzt,3) Jz
tKP1 = (mzt , λzt,2, λzt,3)
JztKP2 = (mzt , λzt,3, λzt,1) Jz
tKP3 = (mzt , λzt,1, λzt,2)
Output to adversary: If S sends abort, then send (Output,⊥)
to all the parties. Otherwise, send (Output, JztKS) to the adversary
S , where JztKS denotes the share of z
t corresponding to the corrupt
party.
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I}) from
adversary S , where {I} denotes a subset of the honest parties.
If an honest party Pi belongs to I , send (Output,⊥), else send
(Output, JztKi), where Jz
tKi denotes the share of z
t corresponding
to the honest party Pi.
Functionality FMultTr
Figure 47: Functionality for protocol ΠMultTr
The simulator for the case of corrupt P0 appears in
Fig. 48.
Offline Phase:
– The steps corresponding to offline phase of ΠMult are simulated
similar to offline phase of SMult (Fig. 36), for the case of corrupt
P0.
– Corresponding to the invocation of ΠaSh(P0, r
t) protocol,
SMultTr receives r
t
3 from A on behalf of both P1 and P2. SMultTr
sets flag = 1 if the received values mismatch.
– SMultTr performs the check honestly and sets flag = 1 if the
verification fails.
Online Phase: There is nothing to simulate as P0 has no role
during the online phase.
If flag = 0, SMultTr invokes FMultTr with input (JxKP0 , JyKP0) on
behalf of P0. Else it invokes FMultTr with input ⊥ on behalf of P0.
Simulator SMultTr
Figure 48: Simulator for the case of corrupt P0
The simulator for the case of corrupt P1 appears in
Fig. 49.
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Offline Phase:
– The steps corresponding to offline phase of ΠMult are simulated
similar to offline phase of SMult (Fig. 37), for the case of corrupt
P1.
– Corresponding to the invocation of ΠaSh(P0, r
t) protocol,
SMultTr sends r
t
3 to A on behalf of P0. It then sends H(r
t
3) to A
on behalf of P2 and receives H(r
t
3
′
) back. SMultTr sets flag = 1
if it receives inconsistent hash value.
– SMultTr receives (m1,H(c)) from A on behalf of P2, performs
the check honestly and sets flag = 1 if the verification fails.
Online Phase:
– SMultTr simulates the computation of m
′
z shares honestly on
behalf of P2 and P3.
– SMultTr sends m
′
z,1 and H(m
′
z,1) to A on behalf of P2 and P3
respectively. It receives m′z,3 and H(m
′
z,2) from A on behalf
of P3 and P2 respectively. SMultTr sets flag = 1 if any of the
received values is inconsistent.
If flag = 0, SMultTr invokes FMultTr with input (JxKP1 , JyKP1) on
behalf of P1. Else it invokes FMultTr with input ⊥ on behalf of P1.
Simulator SMultTr
Figure 49: Simulator for the case of corrupt P1
i) Secure Comparison: The ideal functionality realis-
ing protocolΠBitExt is presented in Fig. 50.
FBitExt interacts with the parties in P and the adversary S . FBitExt
receives J·K-share of value v from the parties as input. If FBitExt
receives ⊥ from S , then send ⊥ to every party, else proceed with
the computation.
Computation of output: Compute v = mv −λv,1− λv,2−λv,3
and set b = msb(v) where msb denotes the most significant bit.
Randomly select λb,1, λb,2, λb,3 from Z21 and set mb = b⊕λb,1⊕
λb,2 ⊕ λb,3. The output shares are set as:
JbKBP0 = (λb,1, λb,2, λb,3) JbK
B
P1
= (mb, λb,2, λb,3)
JbKBP2 = (mb, λb,3, λb,1) JbK
B
P3
= (mb, λb,1, λb,2)
Output to adversary: If S sends abort, then send (Output,⊥)
to all the parties. Otherwise, send (Output, JbKS) to the adversary
S , where JbKS denotes the share of b corresponding to the corrupt
party.
Output to selected honest parties: Receive (select, {I}) from
adversary S , where {I} denotes a subset of the honest parties.
If an honest party Pi belongs to I , send (Output,⊥), else send
(Output, JbKi), where JbKi denotes the share of b corresponding
to the honest party Pi.
Functionality FBitExt
Figure 50: Functionality for protocol ΠBitExt
The simulator for the case of corrupt P0 appears in
Fig. 51.
Offline Phase:
– SBitExt samples a random r on behalf of P1, P2 and set x =
msb(r).
– The steps corresponding to ΠvSh are simulated similar to SvSh
(Fig. 30), for the case of corrupt P0.
Online Phase:
– The steps corresponding to ΠMult and ΠRec are simulated similar
to SMult (Fig. 36) and SRec (Fig. 33) respectively, for the case of
corrupt P0.
– The steps corresponding to ΠvSh is simulated similar to SvSh
(Fig. 30), for the case of corrupt P0.
If flag = 0, SBitExt invokes FBitExt with input (λv,1, λv,2, λv,3) on
behalf of P0. Else it invokes FBitExt with input ⊥ on behalf of P0.
Simulator SBitExt
Figure 51: Simulator for the case of corrupt P0
The simulator for the case of corrupt P1 appears in
Fig. 52.
Offline Phase:
– SBitExt samples a random r on behalf of P2 and set x = msb(r).
– The steps corresponding to ΠvSh are simulated similar to SvSh
(Fig. 31), for the case of corrupt P1.
Online Phase:
– The steps corresponding to ΠMult and ΠRec are simulated similar
to SMult (Fig. 37) and SRec (Fig. 34) respectively, for the case of
corrupt P1.
– The steps corresponding to ΠvSh is simulated similar to SvSh
(Fig. 31), for the case of corrupt P1.
If flag = 0, SBitExt invokes FBitExt with input (mv, λv,2, λv,3) on
behalf of P1. Else it invokes FBitExt with input ⊥ on behalf of P1.
Simulator SBitExt
Figure 52: Simulator for the case of corrupt P0
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